A "uniquely Canadian approach" to freedom of conscience
Provincial-Territorial Experts recommend coercion to ensure delivery of
euthanasia and assisted suicide
Recommendations designed to broaden and maximize impact of Supreme Court
ruling
Sean Murphy*
Abstract
Full Text
The Experts' recommendations are intended to extend and maximize the
impact of the Carter ruling. They will effectively require all institutions,
facilities, associations, organizations and individuals providing either
health care or residential living for elderly, handicapped or disabled
persons to become enablers of euthanasia and assisted suicide. This will
entail suppression or significant restriction of fundamental freedoms.
The broader the criteria for the provision of morally contested
procedures, and the more people and groups captured in the Experts'
enablers' net, the greater the likelihood of conflicts of conscience.
Relevant here are recommendations to make euthanasia/assisted suicide
available to mentally ill and incompetent persons, and to children and
adolescents, even without the knowledge of their parents.
The Experts' distinction between "faith-based" and "non-faith-based"
facilities is meaningless. They impose identical obligations on both. All
will be forced to allow homicide and suicide on their premises, or compelled
to arrange for euthanasia or assisted suicide elsewhere.
Likewise, they
recommend that objecting physicians be forced to actively enable homicide or
suicide by providing referrals, arranging direct transfers or enlisting or
arranging the enlistment of patients in a euthanasia/assisted suicide
delivery system.
The Supreme Court did not rule that people ought to be compelled to
become parties to homicide and suicide, but that is what the Experts
recommend. This is not a reasonable limitation of fundamental freedoms, but
a reprehensible attack on them and a serious violation of human dignity.
Other countries make euthanasia and assisted suicide available without
attacking fundamental freedoms. In this respect, the Experts' claim to have
produced "a uniquely Canadian approach to this important issue" is
regrettably accurate. They fail to provide any evidence that the suppression of
freedom of fundamental freedoms they propose can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society.
Table of Contents
I.1 Formation and work of the Advisory Group
II.1
Moral/ethical unanimity
II.2
"Statement of Principles and Values"
II.3 Recommendations broadening the Carter criteria
II.4
Recommendations impacting freedom of conscience and religion
III.1 Expanded criteria and increasing
likelihood of conflict
III.1.1 "Irremediable medical condition".
III.1.3
Euthanasia approved for future
suffering.
III.1.7
No waiting/reflection
period.
III.1.10
Adolescents and
children.
III.1.13 Euthanasia/assisted suicide by non-physicians.
III.1.15 Doctor shopping.
III.1.18
Physicians need not be
present at suicides.
III.1.20
Euthanasia/assisted
suicide wherever people live.
III.1.22
Families, caregivers
may not be advised.
III.2 Institutions, associations, organizations
III.2.1 The meaning of
institution.
III.2.3 All "institutions"
must allow/arrange euthanasia/assisted suicide
III.2.6
All "institutions" must disclose policies.
III.2.8 "Institutions" may
not manifest or enforce commitments
III.3 Objecting physicians:
information, disclosure, non-discrimination
III.3.3 Objecting physicians must provide information.
III.3.8 Objecting physicians must disclose views and
their
implications.
III.3.11 Objecting
physicians must not illicitly discriminate.
III.4 Objecting
physicians must become critical enablers
III.4.4 Referral or direct transfer
of care.
III.4.5 Referral to "system/third
party."
III.4.8 The Experts'
proposal and the CMA's proposal.
IV.1 Expert recommendations
broadening Carter criteria
IV.2 Expert recommendations
and fundamental freedoms in general
IV.3 Expert recommendations
and freedom of conscience
A1. Carter criteria for euthanasia and physician assisted suicide
A2. Carter and the criminal law
A3. Carter and freedom of conscience and religion
B1. Expanding the
Carter
criteria
B1.1 "Grievous and irremediable medical
condition" includes mental illness
B1.2
Suffering not a prerequisite
B1.3 Competence not a prerequisite:
euthanasia for dementia
B1.4 Euthanasia and assisted suicide for
children and adolescents
B1.5 Assessment, euthanasia and assisted
suicide by non-physicians
B2. Increasing the impact of
Carter
B2.3
Doctor shopping
B2.4
No "waiting/reflection" period
B2.5 Physicians need not be present at
suicides
B2.6 Euthanasia & assisted suicide in
hospitals, hospices, etc.
B2.7 Families and caregivers may not be
advised
C1. Institutions
C1.1 Meaning
of "institution"
C1.2 "Institutions" must allow or arrange
for euthanasia or assisted
suicide
C1.3 All
"institutions" must disclose position on euthanasia and
assisted suicide
C1.4 "Institutions" must not
require patients/residents to give up "the right to access," interfere
with employees providing eutanasia or assisted suicide elsewhere
C2. Objecting physicians/health care providers
C2.1 Must provide information on "all
options"
C2.2
Must disclose views on
euthanasia and assisted suicide
C2.3 Must not discriminate
C2.4 Must act as critical enablers
C2.4.1
Three alternatives
C2.4.2
Referral
C2.4.3
Direct transfer of care
C2.4.4
Transfer to "a publicly-funded system" or
"third party"
C2.4.5 The Experts' "system/third party" and the
CMA's "central service"
D1. CMA
policy: Euthanasia and Assisted Death
(2014)
D2. CMA Annual
General Council, 2015
D2.1 Surveys on
support for euthanasia/assisted suicide
D2.2 Physician
freedom of conscience
D3. CMA
rejects "effective referral"
E1. Netherlands
E2. Luxembourg
E3. Belgium
E4. Oregon
E5. Washington
E6. Vermont
E7. California
I.
Background
I.1
Formation and work of the Advisory Group
I.1.1
The Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group on Physician Assisted Dying
was formed in August, 2015, under the auspices of the government of the
province of Ontario, in response to the ruling of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Carter v. Canada (Appendix
"A").
I.1.2
The venture involved the three Canadian territories (Yukon, Northwest
Territory and Nunavut) and eight other provinces (excluding Quebec).1 The
Group functioned with the support of a secretariat provided by the Ontario
Ministry of Health and Long Term Care.2 The announcement of the formation of
the Advisory Group did not explain how the nine Experts were selected, or by
whom.3
I.1.3
From August until November, 2015, the Experts received 58 written
submissions, held teleconferences with 24 groups or individuals4
and conducted other research. The Experts'
Final Report offers non-binding
advice to the provincial and federal governments about how to implement the
ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada in Carter v. Canada. It
includes 43 specific recommendations. This commentary reviews 19 of
them.
II.
Overview of the Final Report
II.1
Moral/ethical unanimity
II.1.1
The Experts were unable to agree on whether or not a person NOT diagnosed
with a grievous and irremediable medical condition should be able to
complete an advanced directive authorizing euthanasia or assisted suicide.5
Nor could they agree about whether state control of freedom of conscience and
religion should be exercised by legislation or by medical regulators.6
II.1.2
With the exception of these two points, all 43 recommendations and
everything else proposed in the Report enjoy the unqualified support of all
nine Experts, made obvious by the frequent use of the words "we" and "our."
The unanimity is
remarkable, particularly since the Experts propose criteria for euthanasia and
assisted suicide broader than those laid down by the Supreme Court, as well
as recommending policies and legislation to extend and maximize the impact of the
Carter ruling.
II.1.3
A single statement explains how the Experts arrived their unanimous
conclusions. We are told that their deliberations "involved re-considering
and sometimes putting aside deeply-held personal views to find common ground
in the interest of Canadian patients and the public."7
II.1.4
This means that, among the nine Experts, it is "common ground" that killing
patients "should be treated as one appropriate medical practice within a
continuum of services available at the end-of-life."8
It means that all nine Experts believe that it is morally/ethically
acceptable for health care professionals to kill people in defined
circumstances to relieve pain or suffering. If that were not the case, at
least one dissenting opinion ought to have been included in the Report, at
least with respect to the broadening of eligibility criteria and the
coercion of objecting physicians and institutions.
There are none.
II.1.5
To say that one agrees that it is morally/ethically acceptable to
kill people to put an end to their suffering means that is what one actually
believes. It would be absurd to suggest otherwise. Someone who agrees with capital punishment in certain circumstances clearly
believes that it is morally acceptable in those circumstances.
The Experts' unanimous view that euthanasia and assisted suicide are
morally/ethically acceptable therapies gives direction to the Report and has a notable impact
on their recommendations.
II.1.6 It also affects the tone of the Report. Apparently
on the strength of their unanimous opinion, the Experts adopt a
condescending attitude toward the presumed minority who object to euthanasia
and physician assisted suicide. Thus, they acknowledge sympathetically that
killing patients and helping them commit suicide "remains ethically
challenging for some." (Emphasis added.)9
II.1.7 Nonetheless, the Experts want governments and
regulators to use the force of law and policy to compel the 'ethically
challenged' to accept their unanimous judgment that killing people in order
to end suffering, albeit in defined circumstances, is not only legally,
morally and ethically acceptable, but legally, morally and ethically
obligatory. In support of this, they offer a "Statement of Principles
and Values."
II.2
"Statement of Principles and Values"
II.2.1 Under this head, the Experts list a number of
"individual and institutional rights and duties" and "pan-Canadian
principles" upon which they relied to produce their recommendations. Among
them they include the statement, "When rights conflict, they must be
reconciled,"10 a point repeated elsewhere in the Report.11
II.2.2 What the Experts do not acknowledge is that there is
fundamental disagreement about the meaning and scope of virtually all of the
rights, duties and principles they identify.
II.2.3 For example: a "right to patient autonomy" is
commonly acknowledged, and there is broad agreement about what that means in
many circumstances. A particular understanding of patient autonomy underlies
decision of the Supreme Court in Carter, and it is natural for
the Experts to apply it in
recommendations intended to implement the decision.
II.2.4 However, the Euthanasia Prevention Coalition also
appealed to patient autonomy in its leading arguments when it intervened
against euthanasia in
the Carter
case. Legalizing assisted suicide and euthanasia, it said, would diminish
"real autonomy" and would be "fundamentally inconsistent with the principles
of autonomy and choice."12,
13
II.2.5 Further: even those who agree that patient autonomy
justifies euthanasia and assisted suicide may not agree that it justifies
the Experts' view that assisted suicide should be available to the mentally ill, or
that unwilling physicians
should be forced to participate in killing their patients.
II.2.6 The same kind of difficulty attends the other
rights and duties they list. Most Canadians agree that "the rights of freedom of
conscience and religion" are important, but the meaning and scope of these
rights and freedoms are
sharply disputed. Everyone agrees that patients must not be "abandoned," but
many do not agree that offering palliative care while refusing to provide
lethal injection constitutes abandonment. Protection from illicit discrimination is
generally accepted as sound public policy, but a number of
Canadian law societies manifest their opposition to discrimination by
apparently discriminating against Trinity Western University.14
II.2.7 Now, any 'reconciliation of rights' is impossible
absent agreement about the nature and scope of the rights in question. For
example, the Experts assert a right to assisted suicide and euthanasia under
the rubrics of a right to "equitable access to health services."
However, this
is based on their presumption that homicide and suicide are therapies, a presumption generally
rejected by objecting health care
professionals. To demand that objectors accept the Experts' presumption
does not reconcile freedom of conscience, but steamrollers it, and that is
true even if Carter is cited as authority for the presumption.
II.2.8 Hence, while the Experts' "Statement of Principles
and Values" is useful as a framework for purported justification of what they
propose - including the suppression of fundamental freedoms - it is useless
as a starting point for a genuine 'reconciliation of rights.'
II.3 Recommendations broadening Carter criteria for assisted suicide, euthanasia
II.3.1
The Experts recommend that criteria for therapeutic homicide and suicide be
extended by legislation beyond those set by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Carter. This is possible because the Court set only the base line for
legislation. Parliament cannot restrict the Carter criteria, but it can
broaden them.
II.3.2 The broadening of some aspects of
Carter does not
directly impact the exercise of freedom of conscience and religion by
individuals, groups and institutions. For example: public funding for
euthanasia and assisted suicide is not required by Carter, but it is
recommended by the Experts. Such recommendations, and others pertaining to
oversight, reporting, research, etc. are not considered here.
II.3.3
However, the broader the criteria for the provision of morally contested
procedures, the greater the likelihood of disagreement and of conflicts of
conscience among those expected to provide them. Further: some
recommendations that do not modify the Carter criteria have practical
consequences that may result in conflicts of conscience among health care
workers. These recommendations are discussed in
detail in
Appendix "B."
II.4
Recommendations impacting freedom of conscience and religion
II.4.1 Patient autonomy is one of the principal justifications offered for
legalizing therapeutic homicide and suicide.15
On the other hand, those
supporting euthanasia and assisted suicide frequently emphasize that most
people who obtain the services are anything but vulnerable. In his oral
submission, lawyer Joseph Arvay told the Supreme Court how one of his
clients had climbed Mount Kilimanjaro and gone to Russia to protest the U.S.
boycott of the Olympics, and described another as "a Renaissance man." These
were people, he said, who had a "zest for life."
These aren't vulnerable people. These are the people
we're representing. People who have a determined wish to die. People who are
vulnerable never get through the hoops. Because the hoops are really quite
onerous. A person who's really depressed will never get through the hoops.
That's what the evidence was in the case.16
II.4.2 Later in his submission, he attacked assumptions and theories that
disabled persons "are too vulnerable or too fragile or too brainwashed by
ablest society to resist the suggestion of doctors or family members that
they are better off dead." This is, he said, "not only patronizing, it's infantilizing."17
II.4.3 In contrast, the Experts adopt an "infantilizing"
view of patients. They argue that patients must be completely relieved of
the "burden" of finding someone willing to kill them or help them commit
suicide, and that this "burden" must be assumed by "those with the greatest
power and voice," including "health care providers, professions,
regulators and institutions." (Emphasis added.)18
II.4.4 Mr. Arvay assured the Supreme Court of Canada that vulnerable people would
be protected by 'onerous hoops' if the Court struck down the law, but the
Experts seem to believe that patients are so weak and vulnerable that others have to
take over to ensure that they can get through them. Ultimately, the Experts
say, "It is imperative that the burden of transfer to another physician,
institution or third party not fall on the patient," and they demand that
the burden should fall on objecting physicians and institutions in some
circumstances.19
II.4.5 Within this context, the Experts introduce the term: "critical enabler."
A "critical enabler" is any law, regulation, policy or institution critical
to enabling access to euthanasia and assisted suicide, including hospitals,
hospices, long term care facilities, other institutional providers and
regional health authorities.20 "Critical
enabler" clearly communicates moral complicity in homicide and suicide, so
it is a useful term.
II.4.6 Although the Experts do not expressly apply the term to individuals, it
is clear that the Experts want to force individual and institutional health care
providers to become "critical enablers" in some circumstances - even
if the individuals or institutions hold that killing patients and helping
them commit suicide is gravely wrong. Their recommendations concerning
institutional and individual
conscientious objection are discussed in detail in
Appendix "C."
III. The Experts' "uniquely Canadian approach"
III.1 Broadened criteria and increasing
likelihood of conflict
III.1.1
Appendix B1.1: "Irremediable medical condition". The Experts want
euthanasia and assisted suicide made available upon a diagnosis of any very
serious illness, disease or disability for which treatment is unsuccessful
or refused, including mental illness.
III.1.2 It appears that a large majority of
physicians will not be willing to provide therapeutic homicide or suicide
for those who are not terminally ill, let alone for those who are mentally
ill. Of this group, a significant number may refuse to facilitate euthanasia
or assisted suicide for the mentally ill or those not terminally ill through
"effective referral" or similar means. Presumably, similar trends would be
observed among other health care professionals.
III.1.3
Appendix B1.2,
B1.3: Euthanasia approved for future
suffering. The Experts recommend that people who are not suffering
should be able to authorize euthanasia and assisted suicide by an advance
directive as long as they have been diagnosed with a very serious illness,
disease or disability for which treatment is unsuccessful or refused,
including mental illness. Their goal is to ensure that such patients -
especially those diagnosed with dementia - can be lethally injected after
they become incompetent.
III.1.4 Assuming that an advance directive made when a
patient is competent is binding, the Expert recommendation implies that an
advance directive authorizing euthanasia that is signed by a competent patient
becomes an irrevocable death warrant when the patient becomes incompetent.
III.1.5 CMA surveys indicate that the number of
physicians willing to provide euthanasia or assisted suicide ranges from 6%
to 29%, depending upon the condition of the patient, and excluding reference
to safeguards. However, it appears that such surveys have always proposed or
have always been assumed to refer to a scenario involving a patient who is
actually suffering, not someone who anticipates suffering some time in the
future. It seems doubtful that they are a reliable indicator of support for
what the Experts propose.
III.1.6 A further complication is that the health
care professional who receives and approves such an advance directive may
not be the person required to lethally inject the patient some time later. Particularly in
the case of dementia, health care professionals may unwilling to kill a
patient on the basis of an advance directive, especially a patient who does
not appear to be suffering and apparently wants to live. This has already
been illustrated in the case of Margaret Bentley.21
III.1.7
Appendix B2.4: No waiting/reflection
period. The Experts want euthanasia and assisted suicide made
available as soon as the patient has been found eligible and competent. They
reject the imposition of a waiting/reflection period, which, they say, would
"impose an arbitrary barrier to access."
III.1.8 The Experts' enthusiasm for therapeutic
homicide and suicide eclipses the more cautious approach of the Canadian
Medical Association and seems to surpass that of the plaintiffs/appellants
in Carter. The regime proposed by the Experts reflects, instead, the
policies of Amsterdam's Levenseinde Kliniek (End of Life Clinic), which
pulls out all stops to deliver "emergency euthanasia" in response to the upsurge
of
requests during the Christmas season.
III.1.9 However,
Levenseinde Kliniek has been twice reprimanded by the euthanasia oversight
committee for failing to exercise proper care, and a number of pharmacists
have refused to provide euthanasia drugs for clinic physicians, usually in
cases of dementia, psychiatric illness, or patients simply wished to die.
This suggests that conflicts of conscience among health care professionals
are likely to be more prevalent in the absence of a waiting/reflection
period.
III.1.10
Appendix B1.4: Adolescents and
children. The Experts reject what they call "arbitrary age limits."
They argue that euthanasia and assisted suicide should be provided to
children and adolescents who are judged competent to decide whether or not
their lives are worth living. In this they go further than the Supreme Court of Canada, but also further than the
successful appellants in Carter.
III.1.11 This recommendation must be read within
the context of the other recommendations to appreciate its full
significance. The Experts want euthanasia and
assisted suicide made available to children and adolescents who are mentally ill, by means of
advance directives based on anticipated suffering, and that there be no waiting/reflection periods. According to the Experts, parents
must not be allowed to interfere, and may not even be made aware that their
children have asked to be killed or helped to commit suicide.
III.1.12 Conflicts of conscience among health
care professionals are likely to be more prevalent in the face of demands
that they participate in providing euthanasia and assisted suicide for
children and adolescents, particularly in the more controversial
circumstances noted in III.1.11.
III.1.13
Appendix B1.5:
Euthanasia/assisted suicide by non-physicians. The Experts
recommend that nurse practitioners be able to process euthanasia and
assisted suicide requests, including the provision of second opinions. The
Experts also recommend that other health care professionals, acting under
the direction of physicians, should be able to give lethal injections or
provide lethal prescriptions. Even personal support workers should, they
say, be able to give patients the lethal medication used for assisted
suicide.
III.1.14 Allowing non-physicians to provide
assisted suicide and euthanasia would increase the likelihood of
disagreement and conflicts of conscience among other health care
professionals and others who would not otherwise be involved with killing
patients or helping them commit suicide. On the other hand, it might relieve
some of the pressure on objecting physicians to become directly or
indirectly involved in the services.
III.1.15
Appendix B2.3:
Doctor shopping. The Experts recommend that competent patients who
have been found ineligible for euthanasia and assisted suicide should be
allowed to look for physicians (or nurse practitioners) willing to declare
them eligible.
III.1.16 The paradigm example of this practice is
the Levenseinde Kliniek (End of Life Clinic) in Amsterdam, which deals only
with patients whose applications for euthanasia have been rejected by their
own physicians. As noted above (III.1.9), the clinic
has been criticized for some of its practices. CMA surveys of
physicians suggest that the majority of Canadian physicians would be
unwilling to participate in euthanasia or assisted suicide if approved for
the reasons accepted by the Clinic.
III.1.17 Conflicts of conscience among health care professionals asked or
ordered to participate in killing patients are more likely if they suspect
that doctor shopping has compromised the process leading to an authorization
or order to do so.
III.1.18
Appendix B2.5: Physicians need not be
present at suicides. The Experts recommend that physicians, nurse
practitioners or others who prescribe lethal medication should not be
required to be present when the patient ingests it, despite the fact that
complications and adverse effects are more likely in suicides.
III.1.19 Among other issues, conflicts of
conscience may arise among health care professionals
● who consider it unethical or at least imprudent to
absent themselves when the drug is taken, particularly in the case of
patients who are mentally ill; or
● who are called upon to lethally inject a patient
who has not been killed by the prescribed medication, particularly if they
have had no previous involvement in the case.
III.1.20
Appendix B2.6,
C1.1: Euthanasia/assisted
suicide wherever people live and die. The Experts want euthanasia
and assisted suicide provided in extended care facilities, assisted living
facilities, group homes, correctional institutions - wherever people live
and die (III.2.1).
III.1.21 It will be difficult for health care
professionals, care aides, personal support workers etc. who do not want to
be involved with euthanasia and assisted suicide to find work anywhere in
Canada where they can be sure that they will not be required to be involved
with killing patients or residents or helping them commit suicide.
III.1.22
Appendix B2.7: Families, caregivers
may not be advised. The Experts note that families and caregivers
may be advised of plans for euthanasia or assisted suicide only if the
patient agrees. This would seem to require at least some dissembling or
duplicity on the part of health care professionals and others involved to
keep families in the dark.
III.1.23 Conflicts of conscience are likely to be
more prevalent among health care professionals who are uncomfortable lying
or dissembling to families, and those who object to euthanasia who are not
directly involved will almost certainly consider participation in deception
to involve unacceptable complicity in killing, even if it occurs after the
fact.
III.2 Institutions, associations, organizations
III.2.1
Appendix C1.1: The meaning of
"institution." The Experts want all health care
institutions to become "critical enablers" of euthanasia and assisted
suicide,22 but they do not stop with
health care institutions. The Experts want euthanasia and assisted suicide
to be provided wherever people live,23
and "wherever people are living and dying."24
III.2.2 The Experts' recommendations are aimed at
every institution, facility, association, organization or private individual
providing either health care or residential living for elderly, handicapped
or disabled persons in Canada. This includes nursing homes, retirement
homes, assisted living and extended care facilities, and group homes for
mentally handicapped or disabled persons such as those run by L'Arche.
Many of these individuals and groups may hitherto have had no expectation
that they would be actively involved in enabling euthanasia and assisted
suicide.
III.2.3
Appendix C1.2: All "institutions" must allow/arrange euthanasia/assisted
suicide. While they Experts purport to distinguish between
"faith-based" and "non-faith-based" facilities, the distinction is
meaningless. They impose identical obligations on both. Among them, all
facilities must allow euthanasia and assisted suicide on their premises if
they cannot arrange for it to be done elsewhere through a safe and timely
transfer of the patient/resident.
III.2.4 In sum, the
Experts recommend that all health care and residential facilities become
critical enablers of euthanasia and assisted suicide, and that no exceptions
be made for private or faith-based institutions.
III.2.5 To ensure conformity, the Experts recommend that
legislators prohibit anyone in Canada from establishing or operating
private facilities that absolutely prohibit euthanasia or assisted
suicide, or that refuse to arrange for the procedures elsewhere.
III.2.6
Appendix C1.3: All "institutions"
must disclose policies. The Experts want all
of these facilities forced to formulate a policy that sets out how they will
assist residents, patients or clients to access euthanasia and assisted
suicide, and notify applicants of that policy.
III.2.7 As the Experts' other recommendations
make clear, the requirement for notification is not intended to
allow objecting institutions to continue to operate without involvement in
euthanasia and assisted suicide. Its practical and immediate effect will be
to force them to develop policies to ensure access to both.
III.2.8
Appendix C1.4:
"Institutions" may not manifest or enforce commitments. The
Experts recommend a regulatory regime apparently designed to prevent
facilities from manifesting and making effective a commitment to palliative
care, religious or moral beliefs, or a philosophy of life or medicine that
excludes killing patients/residents or helping them to commit suicide.
III.2.9 Thus, the Experts would prohibit objecting
facilities from disciplining or dismissing employees or physicians who,
while working in the facility, actively subvert its fundamental
commitments by promoting or arranging for euthanasia or assisted suicide
during interactions with patients/residents.
III.3 Objecting physicians: information,
disclosure, non-discrimination
III.3.1 The Experts offer four recommendations
intended to control the behaviour of physicians who, for reasons of
conscience, refuse to kill patients or help them commit suicide.
Reference to "physicians" here must be understood to apply to other
health care workers who are acting in the place of physicians, since the
Experts want other health care professionals to provide and participate
directly in euthanasia and assisted suicide.
III.3.2 Of the four recommendations, the first
three concern providing information necessary for medical decision
making, disclosure of views, and a warning against illicit
discrimination. These require only clarification or comment.
III.3.3
Appendix C2.1: Objecting physicians must provide information.
The Experts recommend that physicians should be required to offer the
options of therapeutic homicide or suicide, "regardless of their
personal beliefs."
III.3.4 The Project's experience is that physicians
who object to providing morally contested procedures do not normally
object to providing information that a patient needs in order to make
informed decisions, so this is unlikely to be problematic.
III.3.5 However, it is not clear whether or not the
Experts want physicians forced to gratuitously offer euthanasia and
assisted suicide as treatment options in the absence of any indication
of interest from a patient.
III.3.6 The gratuitous suggestion of physician
assisted suicide even to patients who meet the Carter criteria
may expose physicians to criminal prosecution, since counselling suicide
remains a criminal offence.
III.3.7 In addition, physicians may believe that
offering assisted suicide or euthanasia to patients just blinded or
paralysed by an industrial accident may be harmful or abusive.
They may also be reluctant to gratuitously offer assisted suicide and
euthanasia as treatment options upon a diagnosis of other "irremediable
medical conditions" like dementia, congestive heart failure, or chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease.
III.3.8
Appendix C2.2: Objecting physicians must disclose views and
their implications. The Experts recommend that physicians
"appropriately inform their patients of the fact and implications of
their conscientious objections," and provide ongoing treatment "in a
non-discriminatory manner."
III.3.9 This requirement is unobjectionable, but it
illustrates a bias arising from the Experts' unanimous view that killing patients
and helping them commit suicide in defined circumstances is legally and
morally/ethically normative.
III.3.10 Their unanimity on this point seems to have
prevented them from seeing that the views of physicians who do not object to killing patients or helping them commit suicide
also
have implications for patients. Requirements for disclosure and
discussion of the implications of their views should apply equally to
objecting and non-objecting physicians.
III.3.11
Appendix C2.3: Objecting
physicians must not illicitly discriminate. The
Experts' warning against illicit discrimination is directed to only to
objecting physicians: another example of discriminatory bias. A
warning against illicit discrimination ought to be addressed to both
objecting and non-objecting physicians.
III.3.12 There is actually more reason to offer a
warning about illicit discrimination to physicians willing to
provide euthanasia and assisted suicide, because they are more likely to
be charged with illicit discrimination if they attempt to limit the
scope of their practices: to provide euthanasia or assisted suicide only
for the terminally ill, for example.
III.4
Appendix C2.4: Objecting
physicians must become critical enablers
III.4.1 Physicians who, for reasons of conscience
or religion, refuse to kill patients or help them commit suicide are
expected, nonetheless, to become critical enablers of euthanasia and
assisted suicide. The Experts offer them three alternative
enabling mechanisms: referral, direct transfer of care, and transfer to
a system/third party.
III.4.2 The alternatives are not problematic for
physicians who have no objections to euthanasia or assisted suicide, but
who do not wish to write lethal prescriptions or lethally inject
patients themselves. Nor would they be unacceptable to physicians whose
moral reasoning leads them to conclude that the alternatives absolve
them of culpable complicity in homicide or suicide.
III.4.3 However, all three alternatives are
unacceptable to physicians who consider them to involve unacceptable
complicity in wrongdoing.
III.4.4 Appendix C2.4.2,
C2.4.3: Referral or direct
transfer of care. In refusing to refer patients for
euthanasia or assisted suicide, these physicians are acting no
differently than fellow citizens who would refuse to provide contact
information for a crack dealer or a pimp trafficking in adolescent
flesh. The same reasoning underlies their refusal to arrange for a
patient to be killed by initiating the direct transfer as required by
the Experts.
III.4.5 Appendix C2.4.4:
Referral to "system/third party". The third alternative
is the most complicated: a publicly-funded system analogous to existing
organ transplant systems. The Experts believe that systems
designed for delivering hearts and livers to save patients lives can be
replicated to deliver lethal injections and toxic prescriptions to end
them.
III.4.6 Since physicians are expected to actively
participate in the former, the Experts believe that they should be
forced to actively participate in the latter, if such a system is
developed and publicly funded. In the absence of such a system,
the Experts demand that objecting physicians arrange for patients to be
killed or helped to commit suicide by direct transfer.
III.4.7 In other words, the Experts demand that
objecting physicians actively demonstrate the same level of professional
and moral commitment to killing patients and helping them commit suicide
that they demonstrate in arranging for organ transplants. This is
just as unacceptable to many objecting physicians as referral and direct
transfer.
III.4.8 Appendix C2.4.5: The Experts' proposal
and the CMA's proposal. The Experts' description of their
"system/third party" is similar to a proposal supported by the Canadian
Medical Association, but there are some notable differences.
III.4.9 The CMA's proposed "separate central
information, counseling, and referral service" differs from the Experts
"system/third party" in three ways.
III.4.10 First: unlike the Experts' proposal, the
CMA proposal is consistent with the Carter ruling. Carter
and the CMA proposal both explicitly
affirm physician freedom to refuse to provide or participate
in euthanasia or assisted suicide.
III.4.11 Second: the CMA proposal does not require
objecting physicians to contact the central service or initiate a
transfer of patients and records. The initiative remains with the
patient. Objecting physicians respond as usual to a patient-initiated
request for transfer of care.
III.4.12 Third: the CMA proposal was not
presented or understood to require active participation of objecting
physicians analogous to what is expected in relation to organ
transplantation.
IV. Project response
IV.1 Expert recommendations
broadening Carter criteria
IV.1.1 There is good reason to believe that the
broadening of the Carter criteria in the manner suggested by the
Experts (III.1) will increase the likelihood of
conflicts of conscience among physicians and other health care workers, as
well as the likelihood that those in positions of power and influence will
attempt to suppress freedom of conscience in order to deliver euthanasia and
assisted suicide. This makes robust protection of conscience policies
and legislation all the more necessary.
IV.2 Expert recommendations
and fundamental freedoms in general
IV.2.1 Recommendations concerning the obligations of
"institutions," if implemented, will affect scores of institutions,
facilities, associations, organizations and private individuals or groups
providing either health care or residential living for elderly, handicapped
or disabled persons in Canada, most of whom likely do not realize what the
Experts have in store for them.
IV.2.2 A number of the recommendations directed
at these groups will, if implemented, involve the suppression or
significant restrictions of fundamental freedoms of association, belief,
opinion, expression, religion or conscience. Some, such as the
Experts' plan to prohibit even private non-conformist facilities, affect all
of these freedoms.
IV.2.3 It is appropriate for the Project to take note of this, since
these recommendations are indicative of the mindset and intentions of the
Experts, and with the trajectory they will impart to public policy if they
are accepted. However, most of these issues do not fall within the scope of
Project advocacy.
IV.3 Expert recommendations
and freedom of conscience
IV.3.1 The Project's concern is exclusively with
recommendations intended to suppress freedom of conscience by forcing people
to do what they believe to be wrong: in this case, forcing them to
participate directly or indirectly in homicide or suicide.
IV.3.2 The following recommendations are unacceptable:
-
that objecting facilities should be forced to
allow people to be killed or helped to commit suicide on their premises;
-
that objecting facilities should be forced to
arrange for people to be killed or helped to commit suicide elsewhere by
initiating patient/resident transfers;
-
that objecting physicians or health care
workers should be forced to actively enable homicide or suicide by
providing referrals, arranging direct transfers or enlisting or
arranging the enlistment of patients in a euthanasia/assisted suicide
delivery system.
IV.3.3 The position of the Experts expressed in these
recommendations is that a learned or privileged class, a profession or state
institutions can legitimately compel people to do what they believe to be
wrong - even gravely wrong - even killing someone or being a party to
homicide or suicide - and punish them if they refuse.
IV.3.4 Nothing of the kind is stated or implied in Carter
(Appendix "A"). This is not a reasonable limitation of fundamental
freedoms, but a reprehensible attack on them and a serious violation of human
dignity. From an ethical perspective, it is incoherent, because it posits
the existence of a moral or ethical duty to do what one believes to be wrong.
From a legal and civil liberties perspective, it is profoundly dangerous. If the
state can demand that citizens must be parties to killing other people and
threaten to punish them or discriminate against them if they refuse, what can it
not demand?
IV.3.5 Other countries have hitherto demonstrated that it
is possible to provide euthanasia and physician assisted suicide without
suppressing fundamental freedoms. None of them require "effective
referral," "direct transfer" or otherwise conscript objecting physicians into
euthanasia/assisted suicide service (Appendix
"E"). In this respect, the Experts' claim to have produced "a uniquely
Canadian approach" regrettably accurate.25
IV.3.6 The Canadian Medical Association (CMA) drew
attention to international practice in a recent submission to the College of
Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario:
As many have argued, it is entirely possible not to
compromise or limit patient access on any level without compromising the
exercise of conscience. The argument to the contrary is not empirically
supported internationally, where no jurisdiction has a requirement for
mandatory effective referral, and yet patient access does not seem to be a
concern.26
IV.3.7 Within the context of the Experts'
recommendations, the Project considers the following comment by the CMA
particularly apt:
It is in fact in a patient's best interests and in the public interest
for physicians to act as moral agents, and not as technicians or service
providers devoid of moral judgement. At a time when some feel that we are
seeing increasingly problematic behaviours, and what some view as a crisis
in professionalism, medical regulators ought to be articulating obligations
that encourage moral agency, instead of imposing a duty that is essentially
punitive to those for whom it is intended and renders an impoverished
understanding of conscience.27
IV.4 Legislative response
IV.4.1 In Canada, provincial governments have primary
jurisdiction over human rights law, subject to the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. In view of the notable ethical aggression
demonstrated by the Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group and by some
medical regulators (notably the College of Physicians and Surgeons of
Ontario),28 provincial legislators
should establish as a matter of law and public policy that people cannot be
forced by the state, employers or professional or occupational organizations
to do what they believe to be wrong, or punished or disadvantaged for
refusing to do so. This formal support for what the Project terms
preservative freedom of conscience is foundational.29
IV.4.2 By virtue of the subject matter in this
particular case (homicide and suicide), the federal government has
jurisdiction in criminal law. Criminal law is not used to enforce or defend
fundamental rights and freedoms per se. For that, Canada relies upon human
rights statutes. But Canada does use the criminal law to prevent and to
punish particularly egregious violations of fundamental freedoms that also
present a serious threat to society: unlawful electronic surveillance,
unlawful confinement and torture, for example.
IV.4.3 Coercion or intimidation intended to force
citizens to become parties to homicide or suicide is both an egregious
violation of fundamental freedoms and a serious threat to society that
justifies the use of criminal law. For this reason, whatever might be
decided about laws regulating euthanasia and assisted suicide, the Project
proposes that the federal government make it a matter of law and national
public policy that people cannot be compelled to become parties to homicide
or suicide, or punished or disadvantaged for refusing to do so.
Appendix "F" offers an amendment to the
Criminal Code designed to achieve that end.
V. Conclusion
V.1 Experts less unanimous in their opinions might have produced a
report less condescending toward those who continue to find killing patients
"ethically challenging," more tolerant of ethical/moral diversity, and more
respectful of the moral agency of physicians. As it stands, their
Final Report is a playbook for ethical/moral imperialism under cover of the
rule of law.
V.2 The rule of law is fundamental principle.
However, as Professor Roger Trigg observes, "When those in power
over-rule conscience, even through the administration of law, that could
itself undermine the basis of the rule of law, the purpose of which is to
prohibit the use of arbitrary power."30
V.3 Legislators and medical regulators should note
that the Experts' Final Report fails to provide any evidence that the
suppression of freedom of fundamental freedoms they propose can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
Notes:
1. Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term
Care,
Backgrounder: Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group Convened On
Physician-Assisted Dying (14 August, 2015) (Accessed 2015-12-18).
2. Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group on
Physician-Assisted Dying,
Final Report
(30 November, 2015) (Hereinafter "Report"), p. 1.
3. Ontario Ministry of Health
and Long Term Care, News Release:
Provinces, Territories Establish Expert Advisory Group
On Physician-Assisted Dying. Ontario Leading
Provincial-Territorial Co-Ordination to Seek Advice from
Experts. (14 August, 2015) (Accessed 2015-12-18).
4.
Report,
p. 57-58.
5.
Report,
p. 32.
6.
Report,
p. 60.
7.
Report,
p. 14.
8.
Report,
p. 19.
9.
Report,
p. 2.
10.
Report, p. 18.
11.
Report, p. 3, 15, 43-44.
12.
Factum of the Interveners, Euthanasia Prevention Coalition and
Euthanasia Prevention Coalition - British Columbia (28 August,
2014)(2) (9) (Accessed 2015-09-10).
13. Court of Appeal, on Appeal from the
order of the Honourable Madam Justice Smith of the Supreme Court of British
Columbia pronounced June 15, 2012,
Factum of the Interveners - Euthanasia Prevention Coaltion and
Euthanasia Prevention Coalition-British Columbia (24 December,
2012) 3, 6, 8 (Accessed 2015-09-10)
14.
Jones A.
"Ontario law society votes against accrediting graduates of B.C. university
with 'abhorrent' gay sex ban." National Post, 24 April, 2014
(Accessed 2016-01-01).
15. "[O]ur argument is founded on what Professor
Battin sort of described as both principles of autonomy and the value of
mercy. Because we are seeking . . . to constitutionalize or to strike down
the law that criminalizes assistance in suicide, we don't rely on autonomy
alone. We rely upon autonomy and suffering." Supreme Court of Canada, 35591,
Lee Carter, et al. v. Attorney General of Canada, et al.(British Columbia)
(Civil) (By Leave) Webcast of the Hearing on 2014-10-15:
Oral submission of Joseph Arvay (hereinafter "Arvay"), 113:00 |
491:20 to 113:28 | 491:20 (Accessed 2015-10-28).
16.
Arvay, 115:04 | 491:20 to 115:48 | 491:20; 118:42 | 491:20 to
119:08 | 491:20.
17.
Arvay, 126:38 | 491:20 to 127:00 | 491:20.
18.
Report, p. 43.
19.
Report,
p. 45.
20.
Report,
p. 3, 5-6, 23-27.
21.
Bentley v. Maplewood Seniors Care Society, 2014
BCSC 165 (Accessed 2016-01-02).
22.
Report, p. 43.
23.
Report, Recommendation 27:
p. 41.
24.
Report, p. 46.
25.
Report, Letter
from the Co-chairs.
26. Canadian Medical Association,
"Submission to the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario: Consultation on CPSO
Interim Guidance on Physician-Assisted Death"(13 January, 2016)
(Hereinafter "CMA Submission").
27. CMA Submission.
28. Protection of Conscience Project,
Submission to the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario re: Interim
Guidance on Physician Assisted Death (10 January, 2016).
29. Murphy S, Geunis S.J. "Freedom
of Conscience in Health Care: Distinctions and Limits." J Bioeth Inq.
2013 Oct; 10(3): 347-54.
30. Trigg RH. "Effective Referral."
Paper delivered at conference,
conscience and conscientious objection in health care, 23-24 November, 2015,
University of Oxford. Forthcoming in the Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics.