Protection of Conscience Project
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Service, not Servitude

Service, not Servitude

The President's Council on Bioethics
Thursday, September 11, 2008
Session 3: Conscience in the Practice of the Health Professions


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CHAIRMAN PELLEGRINO: Thank you, Robby. We'll now give an opportunity for the panelists to respond in any way they wish. Dr. Lyerly , would you like to go first?

DR. LYERLY: Well, thank you very much for your thoughtful comments, for reading the position statement so carefully. I neglect that in my deciding that I'm not going to be able to respond point by point and particularly to your concerns because in my agreement to attend and speak at this meeting, I have been - I've agreed also not to discuss the opinion 385 specifically. So I can only speak on my own behalf.

. . . ACOG's Committee on Ethics is not just a group of physicians who get together and make moral judgments. We have people trained in philosophy on our committee, we have people trained in public health, and we have physicians with a great deal of moral wisdom.

But I will say, though, as a matter of fact is that ACOG's Committee on Ethics is not just a group of physicians who get together and make moral judgments. We have people trained in philosophy on our committee, we have people trained in public health, and we have physicians with a great deal of moral wisdom. So I think the concern about whether this is a scientific judgment or a moral judgment should be considered in light of the fact that the committee is a diverse committee both in terms of expertise and in terms of views about the sorts of issues that you brought up. Thanks.

CHAIRMAN PELLEGRINO: Dr. Brody .

PROF. BRODY: I guess I would prefer to pass at this time, if I may, and actually try to hold any comments to questions directed more at what I said specifically here.

CHAIRMAN PELLEGRINO: Dr. Curlin.

DR. CURLIN: Well, I'll maybe just raise one issue that might be the first question to Prof. Brody , which is why - you drew a distinction between mild and strong interpretations of judgments of conscience or conscientious refusals. You said a mild one would imply something like standing aside and that a strong would imply some sort of - I forget the terms you used, but active resistance to or incumbering patients' choices, and I was curious why you put the refusal to refer - this relates somewhat to Prof. George's comments - why you put the refusal to refer in the strong category. How does it constitute an active prevention of someone else obtaining what they seek?

DR BRODY:1 Okay. Thank you. I'm not happy with those terms. I grasped at something to call it, and if somebody could come up with some better terms, I would be grateful. There's a spectrum here, and I think it's a spectrum that - I think I saw a slide in Dr. Lyerly's presentation that had an arrow with a thing at both ends of the arrow I think that got at somewhat the same idea. But there's clearly a spectrum. It's not an either/or.

And at one end of the spectrum I was thinking of actions that primarily involved the individual health professional standing aside, but that was the least amount of interference with the patient getting the service that the patient sought, and at the other end of the spectrum the patient was most inconvenienced or prevented or coerced from having that service provided by the action of the health professional.

So the referral was more in the middle of the spectrum. It was not at the far end of the spectrum, but it clearly put an impediment in the way of the patient getting the service. If the patient was not as familiar with other sources of care or other sources of service then the patient would be relatively more dependent on this provider letting the patient know that these things existed or that they could help the patient get there.

To the extent that the patient is very well informed and is very knowledgeable and has the means to go around and to find out other things, it would be the least amount of impediment. So it might be patient specific or even social class specific in terms of how much or how little of an interference that was with the patient's ability to obtain the service.

CHAIRMAN PELLEGRINO: Dr. Meilaender and Dr. Elshtain .

PROF. MEILAENDER: I want to try to just think about a couple of theoretical questions. I'm more interested in them for the moment than in the particular issues that get debated here. And I have a question for Dr. Lyerly and one for Dr. Brody . But first I have a friendly suggestion, and that is that the use of the language of imposition in these contexts is always misleading. It suggests the need for complicated arguments about entitlements that haven't been made.

And if I'm a person who declines ever to use force against anyone else and you need me to do it in order to protect you and I say, "I'm sorry, that's something I never do," it would be very peculiar to describe me as having imposed my values on you. It might be too bad from your perspective, but I haven't imposed them on you anymore than you would be imposing on me if you tried to persuade me to do it. So I just think the language of "imposition" should be gotten rid of.

But my theoretical interest - it's really a very old question. It's just a form of the "Can a good man be a good citizen" question that philosophers have been thinking about for a long time. And I have a particular question for Dr. Lyerly and one for Dr. Brody .

For Dr. Lyerly , you gave us a slide about different ethical considerations. One of them was conscience, but then there are others - health, fairness, and respect. And these are all the values in play in the situation, and they are somehow to be balanced or we're to decide relative weights or something, and I would like to hear you say more about how one does that, how this procedure of balancing or weighing takes place. That's my question for you.

And for Dr. Brody, you had - the fascinating question you raised under your slide on professional integrity about a professional elevating the - in this case the patient's needs above his own interests, and then you said does one's own interest include one's personal integrity. But then you confused - and I think that's - it's like, you know, "Should I be prepared to go to hell in order to help somebody," a question which theologians have actually discussed.

But you gave the, to me, puzzling example of physicians who should be willing to risk their own lives in an epidemic, for instance, to do it, and then you said, you know, if you'd risk your life, why wouldn't you risk your integrity.

But I thought the reason for a physician being willing to risk his life in an epidemic was precisely that he didn't think staying alive was the most important thing, that there was something else that was morally more compelling and obligatory even than preserving his existence. And that would have something to do with the personal integrity that you seem willing to think may be - one should be willing to set aside in embracing what one thinks is evil.

But I thought the reason for a physician being willing to risk his life in an epidemic was precisely that he didn't think staying alive was the most important thing, that there was something else that was morally more compelling and obligatory even than preserving his existence. And that would have something to do with the personal integrity that you seem willing to think may be - one should be willing to set aside in embracing what one thinks is evil. And so I'd like you to just sort that one out for me a little bit more.

DR. LYERLY: Thank you for your question. I wish had a truly formulated answer to it because the framework that I presented really came to me as I was thinking through considerations from the perspective of the patient, which is I think a perspective that is often not represented in fine grains to the degree that considerations about conscience itself in the profession are.

So as I was thinking about the patient-centered considerations, they really fell into three categories. Again, one was questions about welfare. So the harms that might result from the decisions of providers not to inform, refer, or provide services they find morally objectionable, and I gave some examples of those potential harms. Some may be palpable, measurable harms that we as physicians can see. Some may be express harm. So that's one category that ought to be considered when we're thinking broadly about the category of patients, the effect of conscientious refusals on patients.

The second is questions about justice and how the decisions that providers make that lead to differential access to different - to goods and services. So the degree to which the decisions of providers lead to differential access - how do we measure that.

And the third is questions - and I think it's really - as you said it's difficult to find the correct word, and I have been searching for one and trying different ones on. You know, some might call it respect for autonomy. Some might think more narrowly, especially when we consider questions of reproduction about bodily dominion, so deciding whether you can control what happens to your body, what to die for, et cetera.

So those are sort of three areas that I think there may be different economies with which to measure them. So, again, theories of justice can help us with the differential access questions. Other theories about utility measurement or welfare can help us with the questions about harm to patient health.

But I think the third question, questions about bodily dominion, are really, really difficult ones. They'll probably need a theory unto themselves. But I think it may be helpful to think about them separately as we're balancing. You know, balancing acts are always difficult.

Beauchamp and Childress worked for years to talk about how you might balance principles. So that's not something I personally have worked out, but my hope that as the committee thinks through these problems that those categories would be helpful distinctions for the applications of theory.

. . . the image or metaphor [of] balance, is entirely uninformative. It doesn't actually tell us anything about what we're being asked to do in thinking about these things . . . It's sounds scientific, but it's not.

PROF. MEILAENDER: I don't want to prolong, but I guess I'll go on record as saying I think that the image or metaphor or whatever we want to call it, the balance, is entirely uninformative. It doesn't actually tell us anything about what we're being asked to do in thinking about these things, and it's not surprising, therefore, that the way we balance them turns out to be drastically different from one person to the next. It's sounds scientific, but it's not.

PROF. BRODY: I actually totally agree with you that the example of the risking of one's life in the face of an epidemic threat may be more misleading than informative in that case. I raised it purely to pique the person's interest to go further into it and not with the idea that I thought it was any sort of conclusive argument.

And I think that if we were to plumb this sort of toward the bottom, we would need - in addition to our theoretical account of professional integrity, we would need a theoretical account of the physician's self-interest.

And I have looked at the literature to try to find that account of the physician's self-interest because I believe that ultimately if we're going to teach our medical students that in order to serve the patient you have to put the patient's interests - which Dr. Pellegrino reminded me needs careful definition - just what are those interests - above to some extent the interests - to some degree, at least, the interests of the physician or the health provider, what does that mean. And until you can define both sets of terms, I don't think you've gone very far theoretically.

I have been struck by how often the appeal to professionalism and altruism is completely uninformed by that account of what are the legitimate interests of the provider . . . which are to be put in second place.

I have been struck by how often the appeal to professionalism and altruism is completely uninformed by that account of what are the legitimate interests of the provider against which - which are to be put in second place. So I've tried to inform myself on this issue and, frankly, had a hard time with it. I don't know where that theoretical account lives.

So if somebody knows that, please tell me. Like, for example, how much money is a reasonable amount of money for physicians to make so that if they make more than that, they're greedy and they're putting their interests ahead of their patients' and if they make less than that, they have a legitimate grievance? How do we draw that line? How do we even think about that? I don't know of any ethical literature on that subject.

Please come to Galveston in November 5th to 7th - not now, because November, I hasten to say, is after the hurricane season - and we'll be doing a conference on the physician's duty to treat in the face of epidemic threats, and I hope we'll talk about that, because I think it's a very, very deep and troubling question and I don't believe the existing literature has as yet put the lid on it.

But certainly it's the case that we could - one reason to give up your life or to risk giving up your life is because your professional integrity seems to require it in order to serve the patient. Another reason to give up your life or risk giving up your life is because your personal conscience requires it or your faith commitments require it. That's certainly . So you could have different reasons why you might be obligated to risk your life. And so, yes, I absolutely did not prove anything by throwing that example out, other than to just, as I hoped to say, "This needs to be explored more."

CHAIRMAN PELLEGRINO: Dr. Elshtain .

I want to raise a question . . . that has to do with whether we are not often faced with a particular rather comprehensive morality that refuses to name itself and that is often presented in the guise of a kind of neutral look at the question. . . a scientific view or a kind of neutral view as between competing possibilities, morally speaking, when, in fact, it is not that at all.

PROF. ELSHTAIN: Well, I want to begin by thanking the three of you for your very challenging presentations and also for your very obvious concern for the people that you treat and that you teach. I want to raise a question or develop an issue that Prof. George raised in his commentary, and that has to do with whether we are not often faced with a particular rather comprehensive morality that refuses to name itself and that is often presented in the guise of a kind of neutral look at the question, because I think that's often what's going on when we get a positioning sort of from the point of view of those who, in a rather neutral way, want to look at medical and scientific questions without the sort of taint of extraneous moralities is often presented as, again, a scientific view or a kind of neutral view as between competing possibilities, morally speaking, when, in fact, it is not that at all.

Now, there's a mass of literature by now. It's been accumulating over 20 years criticizing this neutrality argument, most of it written by liberal political philosophers, not conservative political philosophers. I'm thinking of people like Michael Sandel , people like Charles Taylor , William Galston , and a number of others.

And I think what these folks would say is that it's much better to have these moralities unpacked and laid out than to assume we have a sort of neutral view and then we've got a partisan view of some kind and that the neutral view somehow, the sort of scientific view, has to constantly take care that the partial or sectarian view doesn't insinuate itself.

And let me give you, Dr. Lyerly , some examples from your presentation that I think are illustrative of what I'm saying, that there's a morality involved here. I'm not saying that's wrong. I'm saying that it needs to be unpacked, understood, and named.

In your discussion of the pro-life woman with, I believe, pulmonary hypertension - was that the issue, the health issue? And you indicated that her physician, being himself or herself pro-life, might not raise for her the possibilities of or explain to her the possibilities of abortion given the health conflict that she has.

And, again, it occurred to me that in calling her pro-life, you already presuppose a pro-choice position. The pro-life position came into being in response to the pro-choice position. So we cannot assume this woman knows nothing about the alternatives.

So it seemed to me that what was, again, sort of percolating in here was, again, a particular view of the physician, of the patient, of morality that wasn't being put forward and instead it was seen as a kind of clear-cut case, which it clearly is not, of a patient not being well-informed. But, again, to call herself pro-life, as you describe her, means that she certainly is aware of an alternative.

In the example of - I believe it was the lesbian woman who came in for - was it an IUD? It was for some kind of reproductive - yes. And there again it seems to me that what we have is a situation - with everyone's views on those sorts of issues, we have a situation where a patient is coming in with an expressed desire that so far as I can tell has very little to do with what we ordinarily consider medicine or health.

It's a desire that turns on a particular understanding of the self, a particular understanding of ethical and social relations, a particular understanding of where physicians should be in relation to patients' articulation of what it is they want.

So, again, an example, but lifted out of this whole world view, and I don't think it helps us very much. It's better to articulate the cluster of presuppositions that lead to this kind of instance, this kind of example. So more clarification on that I think would be extraordinarily helpful - you know, what kinds of moralities are we talking about here, who's imposing what on whom?

Although I agree with my colleague, Dr. Meilaender, that the language of imposition is tremendously misleading, because no society has ever existed anywhere at any time that didn't mandate certain things and that was not coercive in the implication of those things. Every time we enforce a law, there's an element of coercion. So I think we have to be clear about that.

I think the language of imposition isn't tremendously helpful. We need to think of another way of talking about this because we cannot live with the issue of some kinds of mandates and certain forms of coercion. Liberal societies try to reduce the coercion as much as they can, but it's there, although we often don't like to talk about it very much.

There are all kinds of things that you and I are prohibited from doing every single day, and we're glad that society imposes for the most part. I've got to stop at a red light. It's an imposition. So I think the language of imposition isn't tremendously helpful. We need to think of another way of talking about this because we cannot live with the issue of some kinds of mandates and certain forms of coercion. Liberal societies try to reduce the coercion as much as they can, but it's there, although we often don't like to talk about it very much.

Dr. Brody , in your case, I wanted to just - a couple of questions. They tie into the issue of conscience and the kind of Rawlsian position that you adopt. And I'll try to make this as quick as possible.

In your discussion of conscience you argue that the popular account of conscience, inner moral sense, et cetera, cannot accommodate inner conflicts of conscience. I think that's true only if you are approaching conscience from a strictly deontological point of view. It seems to me that within other alternative understandings of conscience, there is indeed the recognition that conflicts of conscience are going to occur, both within the individual, between the individual and what society mandates, and so forth.

If you look at the whole great tradition of casuistry that we heard something about this morning, the presupposition is that there are going to be some mandates of conscience, if you will, that may at times be overridden because other mandates of conscience trump at a particular point in time. So, again, it's the adoption of a particular moral philosophy that leads to that particular view about conscience and doesn't cover the whole at all.

On the issue of Prof. Rawls and the RLPRG - I have no idea how you would say that - RLPRG, something like that - the group of people that you freely choose. I certainly didn't freely choose Ms. McCarthy in the seventh grade, but she's in my head. I mean, the notion that you could simply at one point sort of say, "I choose you special five people. You're going to be my reference here," that could become entirely narcissistic.

You know what you would wind up with is a nice group of people validating you and some of that horrible language. And I want my parents out of it because they don't like the fact that I've chosen to be a happy-go-lucky beach bum. So, you know, I don't want them saying anything to me. I want other happy-go-lucky beach bums who are going to second my motion.

So I'm not sure that this is again a tremendously helpful way to think about especially moral formation, because most of our - and I'm sure you won't disagree with that. Most of moral formation takes place before we start picking who we want to be with in the world.

So I'm afraid these are more comments than questions, but I thought they might be worth putting on the table for your consideration. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN PELLEGRINO: Next is Peter Lawler .

PROF. LAWLER: Right. And thanks to you all for some wonderful presentations. They're very thought-provoking. I thought the most challenging thing Dr. Curlin talked about was this challenge to the distinction between personal ethics and professional ethics, which you are to assume, that personal ethics is somehow religious or comes from the group which affirms your rational life plan. And we have this. We have to take it seriously; nonetheless, it often conflicts with professional ethics, which is more objective, rooted more in health.

So you knock yourself out to not want to privilege professional ethics over personal ethics, but you still did finally, because one seems rather subjective and arbitrary - you know, who knows where this group comes from - and the other seems more real and scientific. Prof. Curlin said it. I just don't see that going on.

When I see conscientious objection, I see doctors giving reasons and they're giving reasons about health. When doctors conscientiously object to performing an abortion, because they don't see how abortion contributes to health. And the same with contraception and the same when they refuse to prescribe Prozac for ordinary unhappiness and so forth.

And so Robby's objection to abortion is not religious. It may conform with his religious belief, but he writes book after book showing how it's rooted in science, the facts about health. This is a matter of legitimate controversy. And Dr. Curlin had this great quote from Leon Kass where he says, "As medicine gets more powerful, we become more unclear about the ends of medicine because it becomes more unclear what health is," and when we enter the era of enhancement where we'll be able to satisfy people's desires and call that medicine, when we enter the era of biotechnology, it's going to become more and more unclear what health is.

So let's give our - Dr. Curlin gives our doctors more credit. They give reasons. Their objections are rooted in the legitimate controversy - to the legitimate scientific controversy over what health is. So the more powerful medicine becomes, the more the domain of conscientious objection should be allowed to expand because the domain of reasonable controversy over what health is is going to expand. So I wonder if you diminish unreasonably these conscientious objectors by calling them merely religious or merely - you know, referring to whatever that initial group is.

PROF. BRODY: To whom was that question asked?

PROF. LAWLER: I wondered whether you now agreed totally that Dr. Curlin was right in his criticism of you on that.

PROF. BRODY: I will elect to respond, then, if I may. I disagree with Dr. Curlin in one way, and I would want to just add a qualification to what Dr. Curlin said in another way.

The way I disagree with Dr. Curlin is I believe Dr. Curlin has confused two very different concepts. He's confused conscientiousness with appeals to conscience. And there are many, many things in life that I could do conscientiously, and one thing I can do conscientiously is give you moral reasons in defense of my judgments.

. . .I would want to have a very clear distinction between simple conscientiousness and an appeal to conscience.

That does not necessarily mean that I have appealed to conscience in the way I would define - or I take it Prof. Paris would define conscience. So I would want to have a very clear distinction between simple conscientiousness and an appeal to conscience. So that would be my main disagreement.

My qualification I would add to what Dr. Curlin said is that I understood the primary focus of the discussion and came essentially prepared to talk about, when a professional says, "I don't want to do something," and the main reason they give for not wanting to do it is, "It offends my personal conscience," which doesn't have to be religious, but may be religious.

Now, another reason you could give - which I agree is totally legitimate and should be investigated deeply - is, "I object to this because it's not professional. It's outside the bounds of the goals of medicine" or the goals of nursing or pharmacy or whatever. That's a perfectly legitimate line of argument. It deserves very careful scrutiny.

If I take the first line of argument, "It offends my personal conscience," I don't believe logically I'm saying anything that necessarily impacts on any other professional, except those who happen to come from the same philosophical, moral, perhaps religious tradition that I come from.

. . .if I say it in terms of "This violates my professional integrity because it's outside the bounds of dealing with health, it's not a health issue," then I'm implying that no physician of integrity, no nurse of integrity, no pharmacist of integrity really ought to do that either.

On the other hand, if I say it in terms of "This violates my professional integrity because it's outside the bounds of dealing with health, it's not a health issue," then I'm implying that no physician of integrity, no nurse of integrity, no pharmacist of integrity really ought to do that either. They're misguided if they think that they should be doing that.

So those are very different kinds of arguments and they deserve - each one could be a very serious argument and each one could be accompanied by a lot of reasons in addition to the appeal to conscience or the appeal to professional integrity, all of which would then need to be carefully sorted out. Some might be empirical claims; some might be moral claims. Most in one way or another, I agree, are going to be value laden, and we deserve to sort out the value laden features.

So had we wished to, we could have gone in that other direction. We could have said, "Let's look at what do you mean by professional integrity, what do we mean by the goals of medicine, the goals of pharmacy, et cetera." And those are heavily, heavily value laden ethical concepts - what is health. And we could have gone that way had we elected to do so.

CHAIRMAN PELLEGRINO: Dr. Curlin , did you want to comment?

DR. CURLIN: I think that what Prof. Brody is doing is defining an appeal to conscience, in my judgment, too narrowly as an appeal that will not give a further reason and then defining as conscientious reasoning those appeals that give a reason. And I guess I would say that certainly I would agree that a physician who says I am not going to provide this thing that other people think I should provide by virtue of being a physician or because of my position as a physician needs to give some account as to why they don't think being a physician implies providing that thing.

Again, in my understanding with respect to all these areas of controversy those reasons are given. Some people are not as articulate about it, but reasons are given. These are not arbitrary refusals.

And I think I do agree with Prof. Elshtain that there's a lot that's hidden - and Prof. George - a lot that's hidden under the language of standard versus not standard or personal versus professional or private versus public or objective versus subjective or all that language - are hidden in this debate about what, in fact, we're obligated to do as physicians.

And I think I do agree with Prof. Elshtain that there's a lot that's hidden - and Prof. George - a lot that's hidden under the language of standard versus not standard or personal versus professional or private versus public or objective versus subjective or all that language - are hidden in this debate about what, in fact, we're obligated to do as physicians.

And my last thought on that would be just that medicine would not be a profession of such prestige historically if people were having to - if the profession we make implied putting aside things that we think are very good, but rather the reason it's been seen as a noble profession as it's always been understood as a professing upward - in effect, taking on new commitments that are higher, not lower than the ones you had before.

And so the notion that you have a professional integrity and a personal integrity seems to me wrong-headed in the sense that of course you have commitments that are specific to your professional role and those that are not, but having integrity is to know how to act in light of both of those, it seems to me, not to give up one form of integrity for another.

CHAIRMAN PELLEGRINO: I have a problem. We have lots of commentators and questions, so we may at some point ask you to just hold it, and then when you have an opportunity, get it. Prof. Gómez-Lobo .

PROF. GĂ“MEZ-LOBO: Thank you. I want to go back to the very notion of conscience that underlies part of our discussion. And the reason why I do this - and I'm addressing this to Prof. Brody - is because of that claim that certain dictates of conscience ought to lead certain individuals not to choose a health career. I was really worried about that, not because I'm about to embark on a health career - it's too late in life for that - but I think that there's a deep misunderstanding there.

And let me start with the ACOG committee opinion where conscience is - first it says it expresses a sentiment, such as, "If I were to do X, I could not live with myself, I would hate myself, I wouldn't be able to sleep at night," and then the opinion piece goes on to say "according to this definition."

Now, I find that incredible. I mean, it's such a misunderstanding of what's going on. It may be a consequence of that conscience that I cannot sleep at night, but conscience is a particular practical judgment as to whether what I'm going to do is morally right or morally wrong, which means whether I'm going to harm a human good or benefit a human good.

And in that regard I totally agree with Dr. Curlin . It is in a very important sense a public judgment. I have to give reasons. I cannot just say my conscience tells me to do this. I have to go on and give reasons.

And in that regard, for instance, it seems to be absolutely natural and even a duty of a doctor who refuses to perform abortions to say why he or she refuses to perform an abortion. I mean, that has to be clear and up front. It's a human good that is going to be harmed.

Now, if we view it in this way, then there's no conflict between integrity of the physician or the care giver and the benefit of the patient. On the contrary, the judgment of conscience is a judgment about the good of the patient. It's not a judgment about my integrity.

Now, if we view it in this way, then there's no conflict between integrity of the physician or the care giver and the benefit of the patient. On the contrary, the judgment of conscience is a judgment about the good of the patient. It's not a judgment about my integrity. It's a judgment about what objectively I would be doing if I did it and that's why it is such a crucial thing.

Now, I would want to add this on the balancing question. There's a very serious problem there for the following reason. It ultimately seems to me judgments of conscience can be modified. In other words, I can be led to change my judgment of conscience. For instance, if there's empirical evidence about emergency contraception, for instance. That's seems to me absolutely natural. Again, that shows that judgments of conscience are public in a very important way.

But once I have all of the available evidence, once I have decided that it be wrong for me to do it, I have no further way of judging the truth of my - of passing judgment on the truth of my conscience. Now, what does that entail? It entails that there are no occasions in which it would be rational to force someone to act against their conscience because that person would always be doing something morally wrong if she would act against her conscience. So integrity is a derivative of acting in accordance with one's conscience, but conscience itself stands in a quite different position with regard to the patient and with regard to health and the basics of the medical profession.

So I would plead with Prof. Brody , please don't exclude from a medical or a health career someone who thinks along those lines. On the contrary. Thank you.

PROF. BRODY: Yes. If I thought that by saying that there might come a time when one would be forced to suggest to a person of conscience that because you're a person of conscience you ought not to seek a career in health care - I would be horrified if that was a common sort of thing.

However, I gave one example, which I think typifies the sort of very extreme case I had in mind where that might come up and that was the example of the Jehovah's Witness anesthesia resident who would not give a blood transfusion to a non-Jehovah's Witness patient even if the consequence might be the death of the patient.

Now, I believe that someone - I can't remember where I read this - but someone gave the example of would a Quaker, for example, or a pacifist seek a commission to West Point . At some point, practically speaking, there's such a conflict between what you feel required to do as a matter of conscientious commitment and what you know is a role responsibility normally expected of people who undertake that kind of career that there's a serious question of practical wisdom or prudence of saying that's the field of work I want to go into. So that was the kind of extreme case, exceptional case, that I had in mind.

I also thank you for highlighting the question about how your conscience could be wrong and you'd want to give reasons and why it's a public act of giving reasons to correct the conscience if the conscience is mistaken because I think I just heard a minute ago Dr. Curlin say that I said that when you appeal to personal conscience, then you don't have to give any reasons. So I hope I didn't say that.

I certainly did not intend to say that, and I hope that by saying conscience can be corrected and could be wrong, I specifically made that point, that, yes, you could be called upon to give reasons. And often giving reasons is a part of the exercise of conscience.

CHAIRMAN PELLEGRINO: Paul McHugh .

PROF. MCHUGH: I also join in the chorus of thanks to all of you for your thoughtful presentations, and my comments are really comments that come in part out of ignorance of the philosophy, but out of a lot of experience dealing with patients who say they have needs. I'm very worried about "needs" when a patient comes in and tells me that and so therefore I was a little concerned about this little diagram that overlapped conscience with patients' needs.

Most patients' needs turn to out to be wants, wishes, and sometimes fantasies, and our job is to sort them out. But where I come to want to ask a question and relate to what's been said, Dr. Brody , it begins with you, this very helpful distinction that you are making between what were private commitments and publicly made commitments, and particularly in oaths. You made that point.

I took an oath. I took the old Hippocratic Oath, the plain old straightforward, no abortions, no physician suicide, the old, hard line things like that and stick to to this day. And the point that you were making in drawing that sharp point I thought - and I might be wrong about this - is that you said that usually the public commitments were related to a public - to a given public stance where, at least in our society, things were settled on those public issues.

And I want to remind you that you could make a public statement like the public Hippocratic Oath and be at war with what the public stance became. And I want to remind you - I might make reference to three books that have been written in the last five years on each one of these matters that proved how often the physician publicly committing himself to the views of the Hippocratic Oath that was both private and public in that sense - you get up, say it, and do it - proved that they had that public commitment, really meant something that was driven by his real private sense.

And the three books - one was the book by Kevles on eugenics, where 35 states in the union sterilized people because they thought they were mentally retarded. And many of those people were not, and many of them weren't even told that they were going to be sterilized and were distressed to learn later in life that their failure to conceive had been done to them. Okay, and that's the first one. [Daniel Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press, 1998).]

The second arena that has just been recently was a book by a historian at Columbia - H. Scanlan , I think. The title of the book, the fascinating title of the book, is Fatal Misconception. It's a marvelous book on the imperialism of American contraception imposed upon the people of India and China and other places of this sort where what ultimately has come - because we had no - we were so committed to our view on population and had no reason to - we're not going to be held responsible are now held responsible for having done things like enforced sterilization amongst those people. [Matthew Connelly, Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population, Harvard University Press, 2008.]

And then the final book written only a year or so ago is Helen Epstein's book entitled The Invisible Cure [NY: Picador, 2008] where our medical services going into Africa to try to help in HIV totally refused to listen - thinking in mechanical terms refused to listen to the women of Uganda who had demonstrated unquestionably that the partner reduction approach was the correct approach to the ending of it, whereas, we, running our zeal for the condom method, continued to have a huge a death rate for HIV in young women in other African countries.

Again, you made a point that you - this might not have been where you were going to come in, but I want to ask you that question, why you would think that a public commitment that was voiced in terms of care of patients might not sometimes run against the public stance on matters related to services to people.

PROF. BRODY: Thank you for the challenging question, because I think you've - frankly, I think you've wrapped up a number of very, very important issues, and I am going to have a very hard time disentangling them in order to be able to say anything at all wise.

Let me be very simplistic in responding to just one point, which is what is the big deal about the public promise. And what I'm saying is when physicians get up together and say the oath - and what I meant by that was less the content of the oath, but the idea of we all get up and say the oath - is the ability of the public then to trust physicians to have made some kind of promise to them for which we are accountable.

And my willingness - if I am hit by a car on the way across the street to get back to the Metro and I am whisked to an ER here in Washington and I don't know the doctors, I don't know the nurses, on what basis am I going to trust that they will be looking out for my health.

And a very important piece of the reason I'm going to trust them and I'm going to not demand that I see their biographies and did they really get their diploma, et cetera, et cetera, is because I imagine they have engaged collectively in this commitment to the well-being of the patient, that I'm now a patient and I'm going to take advantage of their commitment to my well-being.

So it's really that ability of the public to respond to this public act with the bestowal of trust. And to have that trust be merited, not just, you know, a mistaken trust on the part of the public, but a merited trust in us because we've taken this commitment is what I frankly - was at the root of this appeal to the public.

Now, then, I would just simply add to that - if I go back to my example of should a pacifist seek a commission at West Point, I would imagine that there are folks at West Point who believe, for example, that American military policy today is very misguided and that if they ever were to rise up far enough into the - there may be only a few of them, but if they were ever to rise up high enough in the hierarchy, they would do what they could to change that policy.

And it is good and it shows that we are a vigorous and lively profession if there's this active dissent in our ranks about what do we mean by our commitments, what did we promise the public, what is health. These are all questions that are potentially contested, these are all questions on which some scientific facts are pertinent and moral values are pertinent and social policy is pertinent. As you point out, international relations are even pertinent. And so we should be having a vigorous debate about this

And so whatever I get up and promise the public that I'm going to do - I may have my personal doubts about it. I may carry out internally a dissent within medicine about it, but I have to be careful of when I treat my patients to be sure that I don't confuse my personal take on this contentious issue with the larger commitment made by the whole profession.

So there are some things where we can have a lot - it just so happens that we have a lot of agreement within the profession about what we ought to do, and there are other instances where there's a lot of disagreement about what we ought to do, and I at least ought to be clear on that.

I ought not imagine that if I'm a minority of just a very small number of physicians who believe something that I speak on behalf of all of medicine when I get up and say that thing. That's what I think we need to guard against.

CHAIRMAN PELLEGRINO: I have five members of the Council who wish to comment, and we're checking on seeing whether we need to evacuate this room at 5:00 . I don't know. We'll be finding out shortly. So Dr. Carson .

PROF. CARSON: Just a short comment with perhaps a short rhetorical question associated with it. First of all, I thank the three of you very much. I think most of what was said has general applicability to the medical profession and is very wise; however, when it comes to what I call 50/50 issues, things like euthanasia and abortion where you have very substantial portions of the population that have varying opinions, I wonder if maybe our energies could be better spent looking for ways to be able to accommodate everybody.

I sometimes feel on these kind of discussions that we're in Congress, you know. You can't get anything done. It's my way or the highway. And, in fact, even going to an extreme example, such as the Jehovah's Witness - and, you know, obviously as a surgeon, I give plenty of blood, but let's say someone was a Jehovah's Witness anesthesiologist - you know, I run into a lot of Jehovah's Witness patients who don't want any blood. Maybe we compare those people - the point being that perhaps if we spent a little extra time figuring out ways to accommodate as opposed to exclude, we could get further along in this argument.

CHAIRMAN PELLEGRINO: Next I have Dr. Hurlbut .

DR. HURLBUT: I want to continue in the line of discussion that Alfonso and Paul had initiated and I wanted to ask Dr. Lyerly, is it impossible to put the slide with the quote from Julian Savulescu back up?

DR. LYERLY: I don't know.

DR. HURLBUT: As you try to do that, let me go to where I want to go here. What I want to try to get at here is - first of all, I want to ask you a question and then I want to make a comment on it, depending on what you say, of course. But I want to get at the challenging dimensions of what we're actually doing here, because it's easy to focus on a single issue like abortion or sterilization and miss the larger context of the drift of medicine across time and culture and so forth, and we need to seek a very broad foundation for the future of medicine.

And so I want to just specifically ask you, Dr. Lyerly, in your report what principle of professional obligation did you - where did you draw - more specifically I'm a little troubled by what's already been brought out - the emphasis on conscience being sort of a personally driven thing, and then just a page later you say, "By virtue of entering the profession of medicine, physicians accept a set of moral values and duties that are central to medical practice." And where do you see those as coming from, I guess is the chief question.

DR. LYERLY: I'm not at liberty to comment on 385.

DR. HURLBUT: Okay, your own opinion, then, on those issues.

DR. LYERLY: I mean, I've been asked not to comment or - I've been asked not to comment on the document, and so I really can't do that. I'm sorry.

DR. HURLBUT: Okay, let's forget about the document. Let's go back. We're talking more broadly about the very crucial issue that Dr. Curlin has raised about professional obligation, and I think he's zeroed in on the key question here. What are the professional obligations? They're clearly not just individually decided on from somewhere or nowhere. What would be our sources for this - for understanding these parameters?

DR. LYERLY: How might we understand the professional obligations of doctors and other health professionals?

DR. HURLBUT: Right. Where do we go?

DR. LYERLY: I mean, I think that's a wonderful question for this group to start thinking about. I mean, what I would add and what I tried to reinforce today is that conversations about health and the aims of health need to engage the perspective of the people who will be benefited or be harmed by its provision.

So it is not just the providers of health care or even theorists about health and its meaning that should be at the table, but it needs to be people that live in these bodies, experience the impact or not of conditions, technologies, living in the world, living in cultures, and we need to incorporate those views as we think forward about what the aims of health are.

DR. HURLBUT: In other words, the good of the patient. I mean, that's what you're saying?

DR. LYERLY: Right. I think that's part of it, but what - for us to understand what health is and what the goals of medicine are, we need to hear how people experience what we do. So that's an important part of the equation that I don't think has been there.

I think in the last ten, fifteen years we've been much better at gathering data about that. We've gathered beautiful empirical data about how people experience end-of-life care and it's transformed the way that we provide it. We're beginning to collect data to listen to people about how they experience care during the process of birth, and I expect that that is also going to change the way that we think about pain in labor, support, et cetera.

So in crafting what we think is good health care, we cannot do so and we can't think about whether it meets ethical standards unless we listen, unless we take a moment to listen. So I just - I would urge the brilliant people who are deliberating about this to consider the views of people who experience patient -

DR. HURLBUT: Is the quote possible to show or no?

PROF. ROWLEY: Come on, now.

DR. HURLBUT: Can you read it?

PROF. GOMEZ-LOBO: "If people are not prepared to offer legally permitted, efficient, and beneficial care to a patient because it conflicts with their values, they should not be doctors."

DR. HURLBUT: So, look, I can certainly agree with you about listening to the patient, but it seems to me there are other things we have to listen to and not - and these are very serious issues, because we want to transcend time and we want to transcend culture as we deliberate on these issues.

And the quote that was read seems to - there's something wrong in it, and I can feel it. It's excluding people from the dialogue by saying, "If you don't like it, don't go into this profession." And so what I'd just like to briefly lay out is a couple of parameters that have not been mentioned.

It seems to me that the examples that are given in the paper - sterilization, artificial insemination for a lesbian - one might add issues you didn't bring up like face lifts or growth hormone. How do we decide these kind of issues?

Now, quite apart from whether or not they should be legal or not, there ought to be some reference to - in grounding medicine to the natural standards of health and the eminent powers of the body. And I can't see that some of the issues that you've raised as sort of moral controversies qualify as that.

I mean, whether or not it should be legal for a lesbian to be inseminated is quite different from the question of whether a physician should feel like that's part of his profession obligation. It doesn't seem to me that that's part of the natural eminent powers of the body to be inseminated without the act of sexual intercourse.

Now, maybe I'm wrong. Maybe you could make an argument for that, but it seems to me that by saying in the text that you supplied that she was prompted - this physician was prompted by religious beliefs and some disapproval of lesbians having children - I mean, that doesn't seem to me necessary to label that a religious belief. There's an attitude there that might say, "Well, that's not a natural phenomenon that I'm trying to heal." Do you see what I'm saying?

DR. LYERLY: Again, I'm not at liberty to comment on the paper, but I will say it sounds like you are making an important contribution to thinking about how we're going to define health. And there is a claim that it has to do with - I don't want to misquote here, but having to do with the body's natural functioning. Is that correct?

DR. HURLBUT: Some reference to natural functioning, yes.

DR. LYERLY: So I think an argument can be made for that, certainly, but I don't think that we can take that as truth anymore than any of the other considerations on the table without a moral argument for it. So I think that would be an important thing to think about, but I don't think we need to presume it is or it's not at this point.

DR. HURLBUT: But just to make a brief conclusion of this, it seems to me that - I mean, we're talking about an issue - say just the abortion issue alone. There's an enormous history on this issue. I mean, here just for example from the physician's oath in the declaration of Geneva in 1948, "I will maintain the utmost respect for human life from the time of conception, even under threat."

I mean, this is very different from the prevailing sentiment that's going on right now, and there seems to be a sort of social pressure that's being imposed on the medical profession as a whole to accept this kind of realm of things as though it has no past. And it seems to me if we're going to enter a profession, as your document says, with moral beliefs and values that echo our profession, we should look more seriously at history.

We've got a very challenging era ahead with biomedical technology. It's knocking off balance. The new paradigm for medicine seems to be liberation, not a reference to what would be called restoration or healing of the body. This is going to challenge us very deeply, and if we don't have any grounding in this, if we simply say, "If you don't like it, don't join the profession," that seems to me setting us for some big problems. It's like closing the conversation rather than opening it.

We've got a very challenging era ahead with biomedical technology. It's knocking off balance. The new paradigm for medicine seems to be liberation, not a reference to what would be called restoration or healing of the body. This is going to challenge us very deeply, and if we don't have any grounding in this, if we simply say, "If you don't like it, don't join the profession," that seems to me setting us for some big problems. It's like closing the conversation rather than opening it.

And just to emphasize this, before we had the session I went back - and admittedly this is heavy-weighted and maybe disproportionate - but I went back and I read a couple of papers on medicine under the Nazi dictatorship, and, boy, they're powerful things. I mean, it's hard to believe that some of us in this room were alive when this was going on.

And just to give you two brief quotes, it says, "The chief of the medical institution Hjalmar was responsible for the murder of over a thousand patients. He personally opened the containers of gas and watched through the peephole the death agonies of the patients, including the children."

And then at the Nuremberg trials he stated, "I was of course torn this way and that. It reassured me to learn what eminent scientists partook in the action." And then Leo Alexander , who wrote part of the Nuremberg Code, warned us. He said, "Whatever proportions these crimes finally assumed, it became evident to all who investigated them that they had started from small beginnings. The beginnings at first were merely a subtle shift in emphasis in the basic attitude of the physicians. It started with the acceptance of the attitude basic in the euthanasia movement that there is such as thing as a life not worth living."

Just to conclude, let me point out that the guy whose quote you used, Julian Savulescu, who would like to say some people shouldn't join the profession if they just can't get along with the standards, has himself advocated the creation, gestation, and harvesting of cloned human embryos. And this is a quote. He says, "Indeed it is not merely morally permissible, but morally required that we employ cloning to produce embryos or fetuses for the sake of providing cells, tissues, and even organs for therapy followed by abortion of the embryo or fetus."

I think the last thing we need right now is to be telling people that they shouldn't go into medicine. If anything right now, we need some diversity of views and take this issue of conscience very seriously.

DR. LYERLY: I absolutely agree with you. I think it's wonderful that this committee is taking on this issue. I spoke to one of the committee members earlier and I - in addition to recognizing how important this issue is, I actually think it's a place where there's a potential for good, valuable, deeply rich deliberation.

I was asked by Dr. Pellegrino and Dr. Davis to demonstrate a range of views that's out there right now. They fall on a spectrum. I was asked not to advocate for a single position, but to demonstrate a range of views. I used Savulescu's quote word for word because I think it does show a view on one end of the spectrum, which is a very - a view that is very impermissive of conscientious refusals, which I agree with you are - the role of conscience has a critically important place in medicine and bioethics.

So as we think forward, I think that dialogue is absolutely important. I think to engage in that dialogue with respect for people that don't hold the same views as you that bring to the table different conceptions of health, that bring to the table different ideas of what matters in how we should set professional standards, how we should treat our patients and the like - I think that conversation is absolutely vital.

Its tenor goes up several notches when we're talking about elective abortion, but it's important to a range of issues that arise in medicine. So I think - just in closing I think - I agree with you this is an important conversation. It's not going to serve anyone to shut people down on either edge, but in order to understand that there's a range of views - I mean, it's helpful to look at the edges.

And there has been some conversation today that we weren't contextualizing conversation, but that was partly what I was attempting to do with my introductory remarks. And I think we all come to the table with certain moral views, some of which we are wearing on our sleeve and some of which are very deeply held and we may not recognize it as starkly. So that being said, I appreciate your view and I think that thoughtful deliberation on this is exactly what we should be doing.

CHAIRMAN PELLEGRINO: I'm going to use the chairman's prerogative. We have three more members of the Council who would like to speak. We'll give them an opportunity to make their comments and then afford the opportunity of a response on the part of our panelists. I have Dr. Rowley , Dr. Dresser , and Dr. Landry in that order.

DR. ROWLEY: Mine is going to be very short, and it was just somewhat similar to a concern of Dr. Brody's that Dr. Curlin seems to me to have - in his early examples, they were people who - physicians who disagreed with one another on various aspects of the appropriate medical care, and I think that's very different than the matters of conscience that we are discussing in this particular session. And those I would have classified as more differences amongst clinical judgment. And I think that they have to be separated out from matters of conscience.

CHAIRMAN PELLEGRINO: Thank you, Janet . Dr. Dresser .

PROF. DRESSER: Well, we have this pluralistic country and practice of medicine and it's also organic in that it's changing and we - and I'm sure in a hundred years we'll look back on things we approved of today and shake our - people will shake their heads, so on and so forth.

. . . I would like . . .to talk about accommodation, more about what institutions, professional organizations, medical schools, and so forth can do in terms of procedures, systemic approaches to allow people who have objections of conscience to act accordingly and at the same time to meet the standard of care.

So I guess I would like to second Ben 's statement about - to talk about accommodation, more about what institutions, professional organizations, medical schools, and so forth can do in terms of procedures, systemic approaches to allow people who have objections of conscience to act accordingly and at the same time to meet the standard of care.

I agreed with Howard Brody 's comment about how many of these can be settled within institutions. You just have to plan. People who come in who have objections need to - have a duty to state them and others need to be aware and there needs to be arrangements made. Perhaps in some cases it's not possible, for example the Jehovah's Witness, but it seems to me it's easy to get very polarized and rigid and say, "Oh, patients need them, personal conscience and so forth," but this is a social/professional problem, as well.

And so it's perhaps not as interesting to talk about things like scheduling and so forth, but it seems to me that's where a lot of this will live out and you can minimize the damage on both sides by working on that stuff.

CHAIRMAN PELLEGRINO: Thank you, Rebecca . And Dr. Landry .

PROF. LANDRY: I'd just like to say thank you to the panelists, and just some quick comments about conclusions. Dr. Brody , in yours you look at mild versus strong interpretations, and perhaps that's a way. There's wiggle room to sort of get by. And the idea is that willingness to refer will be mild and unwillingness will be strong.

But then there was an aside about rural areas, and I got the feeling that if you're in a rural area and there was no one else to do it, then willingness to refer might end up being strong because to be mild you really have to perform it. And so maybe these aren't such absolute categories. They're sort of relative.

And the bottom line is you can object to the extent to which it doesn't have an effect. If it doesn't effect, then you're in sort of the other category. If you don't regard that as entirely fair, you can comment.

And, Dr. Curlin , you made an appeal that physicians who have their range of conscientious objection narrowed would be reduced to technicians, but isn't it more likely that they'll just be driven out. Some specialties will soon become hostile work environments and you'll get sort of the equivalent of ethnic cleansing. It will be sort of a ethics cleansing, and you'll get to the homogeneous view with potential on the other side.

I mean, I think a 38-year-old woman in New York or LA who becomes pregnant actually gets a lot of pressure for amniocentesis, and with a Down's diagnosis a lot of pressure for abortion, which would then harken to the issue of this being simply a matter of politics and political views and not really a science driven enterprise. So those are my comments.

CHAIRMAN PELLEGRINO: Thank you very much. Now we'll give an opportunity for each of the panelists to make what comment they would like to make. I'll start with Dr. Curlin .

DR. CURLIN: If I can begin with the last comment, I think that they would be both driven out as well driven being technicians in this sense. And I don't want to make it overdramatic. At this stage most people of a wide range of moral views can effectively practice and are not being driven out, although there seems like there's a growing sense of a threat.

But they would be, of course, driven out if they were required to do things that they could not in good conscience do. They would have to, to live with understanding and live with integrity, leave the profession.

But they would also, I think - the profession is driven toward a provider/consumer model because the impulse that leads - and it comes out in all these essays - that leads to the judgment that we should constrain conscientious refusals is something on the order of "Doctors have no business making judgments about whether that thing is good for patients or they don't have the authority to make that judgment, or if they do make that judgment, that's a threat."

And so to the extent doctors retreat from - and Prof. Brody in that essay about , I don't need - if I'm misinterpreting how it would apply to this situation, I'll let him to speak that, but it said that what you don't want is doctors retreating from making recommendations, retreating from seeing themselves as responsible for your good, responsible for your health. And to the extent you say, well, you're responsible so long as you are willing to do these things that you think are not ethical, then I think that drives in that direction.

And with respect to Prof. Rowley 's comment, I do think there is a difference between disagreements that you described as clinical judgment. You said some are clinical judgments versus appeals to the conscience. They are different, but the difference is in some cases you have an agreement about what the ends of medicine are, about what we're after here, and a disagreement about how best to pursue it.

The difference is not that one is conscientious and one is not. The difference is that some are disagreements about what the ends of medicine are and some are disagreements about how to achieve those ends. And then within the former - about what the ends of medicine are - sometimes these disagreements track onto religious teachings and some don't.

And it seems to me that in our culture, because of these rubrics of private versus public and whatnot, those that can be seen as tracking more directly onto religious disagreements are seen in a kind of prima facie way and I think in an incorrect way as being less valid to be considered in one's making decisions about one's practice.

CHAIRMAN PELLEGRINO: Dr. Brody .

PROF. BRODY: Specifically in response to Dr. Lawler's comment, which was quite helpful, I would ask you that if you wish to consider what I said to see whether it's of some value for your deliberations here, please keep in mind the title "Two promises."

The reason I say that is because - if I may give an analogy - it may be a very, very imperfect analogy - I believe today I made two promises. I made an implicit promise to my wife that if our home were to be threatened, I would be at her side and would not go running away to some academic thing that would take me away from my home responsibilities, and I made a promise to the President's Council on Bioethics to be here at this hearing.

Whether I'm able to keep both promises has a lot to do with how fast a certain hurricane is moving across the Gulf of Mexico and which direction it's going. I may find tonight that I was able to get home in plenty of time and do what I need to do and all will be well. I may discover that I was too late and I'm trapped in Washington and she's trapped in who knows where. And a lot of practical things will get in the way of whether I'm able to keep both promises or whether I find that my commitment to one promise interfered with my ability to keep the other promise.

So it may seem cute or sort of begging the question if I said, well, the rural circumstances may be different, but sadly, I think, if you look at it from the point of view of these are two promises - and I believe - the reason I said two promises is because I happen to share the concern people have with the idea of balance.

I wanted to avoid the idea that we're trying to balance something, and so I was looking for another way to say that, that I hoped would be more enlightening. And I chose the two promises, and maybe it worked, maybe it didn't, but I think your comment gets right to the heart of what might be of value or might not be of value in making that analogy of the two promises.

And just to complete, since we are looking back at slides, I would like to read my last slide, because I believe it very much fits with what Dr. Dresser said and what Dr. Carson said. My last slide was titled "Personal Hope."

"In the future we will see more examples of conscientious objection dealt with by local accommodation in the spirit of mutual respect and few instances of the use of political or financial power to favor only one promise."

CHAIRMAN PELLEGRINO: Thank you, Howard . Dr. Lyerly .

DR. LYERLY: Well, that would have been a beautiful way to end on hope, but I just want to take a minute to address a worry that seems to have surfaced today, which I find interesting and not one that had struck me particularly, and I wonder if it's just the way that we think about things, namely that limitations or potential accommodation of providers' rights of conscientious refusal necessarily are going to translate into a provider/patient relationship in which one is the technician and one is the consumer of goods.

I think what the concern is on the side, too, of individuals that are worried about the expression of conscience is also silence in that relationship between doctor and patient, that not talking about options, not exploring the ways in which those options might have meaning for somebody, but instead refusing to talk about things and refusing to make sure that the patient's needs - and I don't consider the patient's needs frivolous. I consider them deep and concerning and oftentimes not intuitive - you know, how to make sure that those things are met.

And so in some ways it may have to do with the idea of what sorts of things a conversation can do. So if we're only talking about conversations being an exchange of information or the provision of - or attempts to persuade people to do one thing or another, then I can see where that concern comes from. But conversations do a lot more.

Conversations between patients and their physicians establish trust, they help shape options for people, they make people feel cared for, and my sense is that that is and continues to be a goal for people who are concerned both about maintaining providers' rights to conscience and also about individuals who are concerned about the impact of expression of conscience on patients' well-being.

CHAIRMAN PELLEGRINO: Thank you very much. You three panelists really put on a heavy afternoon, and we really appreciate it. Thank you.
Notes

The President's Council on Bioethics was appointed by President George W. Bush and operated from 2001 to 2009. 

Source: Archived transcript of the session.