Scientific and Philosophical Expertise: An Evaluation of the Arguments
on "Personhood"
Linacre Quarterly February 1993, 60:1:18-46
[Edited, September 20, 1996]
(Reproduced with Permission)
Dianne N. Irving, M.A., Ph.D.
*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
III. BIOLOGICAL MARKER EVENTS OF PERSONHOOD
I. INTRODUCTION
All too often lately we hear or read the lament,
"We just don't or can't know what a human being or a
human person really is", or, "There just is no
consensus or agreement on what the definition of a
"human being" or a "human person" is, so why should
one person's or one group's definition be preferred
over any other. The definition of a "human being" or
of a "human person" just cannot be objectively
determined, and so must remain a relative one."
The aim of this paper is to debunk these current
myths concerning the relativism of what a human
being or a human person is, and to at least raise
the question at the end of how these "myths" came
about even at the level of scientific and
philosophical professional "expertise". What I will
argue is that we can and do have an objective and
empirically-based definition of a human being and a
human person, and that, other than conceptually, one
cannot really split a human being from a human
person. "Personhood" begins when the human being
begins -- at fertilization.
Toward this end I will address some of the kinds
of major scientific and philosophical arguments used
to support the sudden appearance of "personhood" at
different biological "marker events", indicating
that such arguments are arbitrarily grounded on
scientific data which is incorrect or misapplied;
and that the philosophical claims of these arguments
are arbitrarily grounded in systems of philosophy
which are themselves very problematic, as any
historian of philosophy well knows,1
with highly indefensible definitions of a "human
being" or of a "human person." Such definitions are
actually remnants of those philosophical systems in
which conceptual mind/body splits are still
sustained, even today. It is important to understand
that the question of "personhood" is not simply
restricted to some wild-eyed academic's preferred
theoretical ramblings, but that the issue has now
been translated into the quite practical question of
whether or not these "tiny" human beings are as
protected ethically, socially and legally as are
more "mature" human beings. The really "burning"
question is: if the early human embryo is a human being, is it also a human person?
II. GENERAL SCIENTIFIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ISSUES
Before addressing the specifics of the science
and philosophy, some general charts are provided for
an over-all view of the issues. Only a few of the
major marker events will be covered, as the actual
list is quite long. I refer you, however, to my own
analysis of 26 arguments which goes into much
greater detail.
Fig. 1 indicates some of the suggested biological
marker events during embryological development --
from just before fertilization to about 14-days.2
During this period the major philosophical issues
include whether the early human embryo is an
individual (a prerequisite for personhood), and/or
if he/she actually possesses the genetic or formal
capacity of a human being or human person. It is
during this period also when mass-confusion reigns
on the philosophical misuse of the terms
"possibility", "probability", "potentiality" and
"potency". These positions are generally arguing for
either the actual capacity for, or the actual
exercising of either "rational attributes" or
"sentience".
Daly3
represents the type of argument which claims that
"personhood" begins at the time when the sperm h as
penetrated the ovum. Examples of positions arguing
for "fertilization" are my own, or Ashley and O'Rourke4
(although within the advocates of "fertilization",
much ambiguity exists as to which point during the
process of fertilization itself "personhood"
begins). Suarez5
will argue for the 2-cell stage. And a great deal of
the current literature consists of arguments for the
14-day stage.6
In these latter arguments a general distinction can
be made between those which contain elements
concerning the pre-condition for the exercising of
so-called "rational attributes" -- e.g.,
self-awareness, self-consciousness, interaction with
the environment, etc. -- and those concerning the
pre-condition for sentience, or the ability to feel
pain or pleasure. For those unfamiliar with
philosophy, let me just point out that such
distinctions -- as well as those that will follow --
are grounded in different philosophical schools of
thought.
Some of the suggested biological marker events
range from 14-days and after, as indicated in
Fig. 2.7
During this period the major philosophical issues
include: individuality, the biological substrate as
the precondition for the capacity for "rational
attributes", or for "sentience" -- or for the actual
exercising of those capacities. The full integration
of those substrates and capacities are also at
issue.
As noted, writers such as Bole8
argue that individuality and ensoulment are not
possible until after 2-6 weeks, whereas Singer and
Wells9
argue that only after 6 weeks is sentience possible.
At 8 weeksLockwood10
argues for the beginning of "personal identity", and
Shea11
for that point where the brain actually controls
bodily functions as a whole. Finally, there are
those who focus not on the mere capacity but the
actual integration and exercising of "rational
attributes" and/or sentience as a condition for true
personhood, such as Hare12
, Engelhardt13or
Singer14.
As these and similar distinctions made between a
human being and a human person are really
philosophical distinctions, I have sketched the
major historical philosophical sources of a
mind/body split in Fig. 3 (although one could go
back to Plato and beyond).15
The major point I want to indicate is that some
philosophical schools of thought define a human
being as one whole substance, and thus there
is no mind/body split inherent in their theories.
Such theories define a human being in terms of the
actual nature of the human substance.
Characteristics such as "rational attributes",
sentience, moral autonomy, etc., are only activities
of powers which are of secondary consideration,
because they are consequent to or follow upon the
actual nature of that substance.16
Other "schools" do maintain a mind/body split
inherent in their theories; a human being is defined
as two independent and separate substances.
Interestingly, most of the theories addressed here
are derivative of these modern philosophies,
especially that of Descartes.17
An entire paper -- or even a book -- could be
dedicated to explaining the theoretical and
practical consequences of such mind/body splits,
especially in the present context. Suffice it to
point out that where there is such a split -- where
the mind (or even the whole "soul") is an
independent substance in and of itself, separate or
apart from the "body" (which is seen as an
independent and separate substance in and of itself)
--, then it is impossible either theoretically or
biologically to "piece them back together again", as
Humpty Dumpty might have said. Nor could one explain
any interaction between these separate "substances"
of mind and body. We can see the effect of such
Cartesian dualism -- and the consequent historical
breaking-off to either rationalism or empiricism --
in the distinctions writers make here between a
human being and a human person.
III. BIOLOGICIAL MARKER EVENTS OF PERSONHOOD
There are enumerable points along the continuum
of embryological development at which different
writers claim the appearance of so-called
"personhood". These are claimed as "biological
marker events of personhood" -- before which there
is only a human being (at best); and after which
there is a human person. Before that biological
point, then, the human embryo or human fetus is
considered as only an "object", a "thing" which may
be used or dealt with according to the personal
objectives or desires of a human person. After that
particular biological marker event we suddenly have
a human person, who is now considered a "subject" or
an entity deserving of protections against the
interests, objectives or desires of another human
person.
A. Fertilization as the beginning of personhood
In order to identify the major issue quickly, a
few questions might be posed so as to clarify at the
start exactly what is at stake when we define a
human being or a human person in one way or another.
If our definition is incorrect -- even in part --
then the consequences of this incorrect definition
are long-ranged and potentially profound. Aristotle
reminds us of something we all know too well. To
paraphrase him: a small error in the beginning leads
to a multitude of errors in the end.18
In this case, if one's definition of a human person
is incorrect, then one might find one's self
experimenting on or euthanizing something which one
thought was not a human being or a human person --
but which in fact really is.
So I pose the question -- how would you yourself
define a human person? Would you consider any of the
following a human person: a rock; a head of cabbage;
a giraffe; ...those who are old and senile in a
nursing home; Alzheimer's patients; Parkinsonian
patients; stroke victims; comatose patients; drunks
and alcoholics; drug addicts; the homeless, poor;
prisoners; the emotionally ill and depressed;
mothers-in-law; teenagers; the physically
handicapped; the mentally ill; children under 7
years of age; a new-born baby; the fetus before the
mother has given birth (or, at 6 months, 8 weeks, 35
days, 14 days, 6 days, 2 days, fertilization, or the
egg or the sperm). These latter examples actually
constitute some of the different biological markers
at which various writers variously claim that there
is present a human person. Obviously there is some
disagreement about exactly when we have,
definitionally, a human person present. And that
period of time between fertilization and 14 days is
the grayest area, i.e., the seemingly most difficult
and most controversial stage.
What, then is a human being or person -- and when
does he or she begin? I will argue that at the
biological marker of fertilization a substantial
change (or a change in natures) has taken place --
and a new, unique, living, individual embryonic
human being who is simultaneously a human person is
present. I will also argue that from fertilization
onward -- including the zero to 14-day old embryonic
human stage -- until the death of the adult organism
-- accidental change (or a change only in
accidents) has taken place, in which a human
being/person is continuously present.19
1. The connection between science and philosophy
First, although a question about "natures" seems
to be fundamentally a philosophical one, I would
argue that any philosophical reflections, analyses
or accounts about the nature of a human being or
person must begin or start with the empirically
observable biological facts.20
Otherwise our philosophical concepts actually bear
little or no relation or resemblance to the real
world which we are trying to understand and explain
by those philosophical concepts. Instead, I would
suggest, we are left with multiple half-truths or
fantasies -- or wishful thinking! Epistemologically,
the starting point of our philosophical questions
and investigations about reality must be grounded in
that empirical and scientific reality. Only in this
way can we have a realistic or objectively-based
definition of a human being -- one that is not
relativistic.
Operationally, what is the connection between a
thing's nature and the biological facts? Put
briefly, the answer is that we can know what
a thing is (i.e., its nature) by observing its
actions and functions -- how it behaves, what it
does. We know that a thing acts according to the
kind of thing it is, i.e., its nature. That is
simply an empirically observable fact. In first-year
chemistry or in microbiology students are given
"unknowns", the nature of which they must identify
by means of the kinds of actions or reactions
exhibited by these "unknowns" as observed in the
lab. Indeed, this is the obvious principle behind
any basic or experimental research. The research
biologist first observes the actions, reactions,
functions of a biological entity and reasons from
these specific kinds of actions back to the specific
kind of nature it possesses. It is this nature which
directs and causes such characteristic actions.
As biology texts themselves discuss it: function
follows form.21
Thus Na burns orange, and cobalt burns blue/green
-or beta-hemolytic streptococcus can only be grown
on specific culture medium containing blood, but not
on other mediums. Further, a thing is not only
characterized by its nature, which determines the
specific kinds of actions it can do -- but that same
nature limits the kinds of actions it can do. That
is, there are certain actions which a thing can not
do because it does not have the specific kind of
nature it would need to do it. For example, birds
have wings and so can fly -- but stones, dogs or
human beings can't fly; corn stalks produce ears of
corn and corn proteins and corn enzymes -- but
acorns, tomato plants or asteroids do not and cannot
produce corn or corn proteins. Frog embryos direct
the formation of frog tissues and organs -- but they
cannot direct the formation of human tissues and
organs.
Apply these considerations to the point at hand.
To determine what a human being or person is is
really not all so difficult as is often claimed. We
are not Gods or angels -- but embodied human
beings.22
We do have bodies -- don't we? At least I have never
seen a simple "soul" wandering aimlessly around the
labs, manipulating a computer, cooking dinner or
playing soccer without a body. In fact, I have never
seen even a Platonic or a Cartesian philosopher
"thinking" without his or her body! As Aristotle
noted, the whole man thinks; the whole man knows;
and the whole man acts.23
There are voluminous biological facts which we do
know already about the human body and its
embryological development. Clearly by observing and
studying these known biological facts -- how the
human being begins his or her biological existence
as a specifically human zygote, and the kinds
of specifically human functions and human
actions that take place during embryological
development -- we can then determine to a very
sophisticated extent the nature of a human being or
a human embryo -- or "what" it is. So I will turn
now to a brief consideration of the well-known,
well-referenced biological facts concerning when the
life of a human being begins to exist and how it
then merely grows and develops during embryogenesis,
without changing "natures".
2. The scientific facts
Before fertilization there exist a human sperm
(containing 23 chromosomes) and a human ovum (also
containing 23 chromosomes -- the same number, but
different kinds of chromosomes).24
Neither the sperm nor the ovum, singly, by itself,
can become a human being -- even if implanted in the
womb of the mother. They are only gametes -- they
are not human embryos or human beings. In contrast,
the single-cell embryonic human zygote formed after
fertilization (the beginning of the human being and
the embryonic period)25
contains 46 chromosomes (the number of
chromosomes which is specific for members of the
human species) -- and these 46 chromosomes are mixed
differently from the 46 chromosomes as found in
either the mother or the father -- that is, they are
unique for that human individual. And at the
single-cell embryonic human zygote stage that unique
individual human being is already genetically a girl
or a boy.26
If allowed to "do his or her own thing", so to
speak, this embryonic human zygote will biologically
develop continuously without any biological
interruptions, or gaps, throughout the embryonic,
fetal, neo-natal, childhood and adulthood stages --
until the death of the organism. And with the advent
ofin vitro fertilization techniques, we can
see that the early human embryo can develop in vitro
on his or her own without the nutrition or
protection of the mother for quite a while --
someday, perhaps, even until "birth"!
I want to reiterate that a human gamete is not a
human being or a human person. The number of
chromosomes is only 23; it only acts or functions
biologically as an ovum or as a sperm, e.g., it only
makes ovum or sperm enzymes and proteins, etc., not
specifically human enzymes and proteins; and by
itself it does not have the actual nature or potency
yet to develop into a human embryo, fetus, child, or
adult. And in that sense gametes are only
possible human beings (i.e., human beings who do
not exist as yet). Only after the sperm and the ovum
chromosomes combine properly and completely do we
have a human being. Individually, the nature of a
sperm is different from the nature of an ovum -- and
both are different from the nature of the embryonic
human zygote which is formed when their chromosomes
combine.
Thus from perhaps an Aristotle-the-biologist's
point of view, one would say that before
fertilization there are two natures -- i.e., the
nature of an ovum and the nature of a sperm. After
fertilization there is a human zygote with one
nature, i.e., the nature of a human being. Thus, in
fertilization there is substantial change,27
(i.e., a change in substance or nature -- or "what"
it is). The substances or natures of the ovum and
the sperm have changed into the nature of a human
being. This is, in fact, known empirically by
observing the number and kinds of chromosomes
present before and after fertilization, and by
empirically observing the different
characteristically specific actions and functions of
the ovum, the sperm, and the human zygote. Once
fertilization has taken place and the new human
being has formed, only accidentalchange28
occurs (e.g., a change in weight, height, size,
shape, etc.), and we know this empirically as well.
We can observe that the nature of the human being
does not change (e.g., into a cabbage or a giraffe),
only its human accidents change.
Thus embryological development does not entail
substantial change, but only accidental change. Once
it is a human being it stays a human being, and acts
and functions biologically as a human being. The
human zygote produces specifically human enzymes and
proteins; he or she forms specifically human tissues
and organ systems, and develops humanly continuously
from the stage of a single-cell human zygotic embryo
to the stage of a human adult.29
This is observed empirically. A human
zygote does not produce cabbage or carrot enzymes or
proteins, and does not develop into a rock, an ear
of corn, nor into a cat, a horse, a chicken, or a
giraffe. Empirically it is observed that a human
zygote produces specifically and characteristically
human proteins and enzymes at the moment of
fertilization -- as demonstrated recently, for
example, by experiments using transgenic
mice30
-- and that he or she develops continuously
throughout embryological development in a
specifically and characteristically human way.
In short -- the biological facts demonstrate that
at fertilization we have a real human being with a
truly human nature. It is not that he or she will
become a human being -- he or she already is a human
being. We know that empirically. And this nature or
capacity to act in a certain characteristic way is
called, philosophically, a nature or a
potency.31
Thus a human zygote or embryo is not a possible
human being;32
nor is he or she a potential human
being;33
he or she is already a human being. A human zygote,
embryo or fetus does not have the potency to become
a human being, but already possesses the nature or
capacity to be at that moment a human being. And
that nature will direct the accidental development,
i.e., the embryological development, of his or her
own self from the most immature stage of a human
being to the most mature stage of a human being.
Now, this is strongly convincing empirical
evidence that at fertilization there is present a
human being (the well-referenced unequivocally
agreed upon answer to the scientific question); but
is there also a human person (a philosophical
question) -- or not? These are two different
questions -- one scientific, the other
philosophical. It is in this shifting from the
paradigm of a human being to that of a human person
where the philosophy -- and the confusion -- come
into play. Is a human being also a human person; or
are they different things? Which philosophy is
adequate to cope with this biological data?
3. The matching philosophical concepts
(Fig. 3) With even only a cursory rummaging
through the history of philosophy, there is one
major "realistic" philosophical "ball-park" which
would in fact deny that there was any real (as
opposed to conceptual) essential distinction between
a human being and a human person. That is, in the
real world which we experience empirically, they
cannot really be split or separated -- except
perhaps only conceptually. This philosophy was
part of a 2500 year old tradition which was the bath
water, so to speak, that was "thrown out with the
baby". It is the philosophical ball-park, for
example, of Aristotle-the-biologist.34
For Aristotle -- as well as for others, such as
Thomas Aquinas -- his major metaphysical and
anthropological treatises argue consistently for a
single human substance with no mind/body split
(although there is evidence of a serious Platonic
streak in his De Anima -- that atypical and
historically problematic treatise of Aristotle's so
often quoted by contemporary scholars -- as well as
historians who researched for Roe vs Wade).
As Aristotle argues:
"...'nature'
has two senses -- matter and form. If one considers
'nature' as the form, then it would be the shape or
form (not separate except in statement) of things
which have in themselves a source of
motion"35
(emphasis added).
Again, he says:
..."the physicist is concerned only with
things whose forms are separable [in the mind],
indeed, but do not exist apart from
matter."36
And similarly, matter cannot exist apart from the
form. For Aristotle, the human being is defined as
one composite substance -- the vegetative, sensitive
and rational powers of the "soul" together with the
human "body".37
The whole soul, he wrote, is homogenous, and in each
part of the body as one whole composite:
In each of the
bodily parts there are present all the parts
of the soul, and the souls so present are
homogenous with one another and with the whole;
this means that the several parts of the soul are
indisseverable from one another.38(emphasis
added)
And in contrast to his opposite view in the very
same De Anima, Aristotle addresses the very
possibility of a "being-on-the-way", or an
"intermediate" human being, railing against the
anthropological consequences of Plato's or
Pythagoras' mind/body split when he very
sarcastically retorts: "Yet how are we to believe
in such things?" (emphasis in the
original).39
Although Aristotle-proper did not actually use the
term "person", he clearly would have to concur that
a human being is always a human person, for neither
form nor matter can exist on their own as two
different things or independent substances.
Thomas Aquinas, to give another example, puts an
even finer gloss on Aristotle's anthropology, by
affirming his own adamant rejection of Plato's
anthropology. To paraphrase Thomas: the name of
"person"(and he uses that term) does not belong to
the rational part of the soul, nor to the whole soul
alone -- but to the entire human substance (or,
subsistens).40
This means that the whole soul, whole body and its
act of existing constitute one substance entire --
with no separate and troublesome independent "parts"
each of which are claimed to be true and independent
whole substances. And it is worth noting that
Aquinas is one of the only philosophers whoincludes
undesignated matter in his formal definitions of
natural things -- of which man is one.41
For Thomas a human being is a human person, and
the later characteristics which we will look at in
these debates, such as "rational attributes",
autonomous willing or sentience, are only
consequential and secondary or accidental actions
which follow upon certain powers (not "parts") which
themselves follow upon the essential nature of the
human being itself.42
That nature is defined as the single, whole, formal,
material and existential human substance. As Thomas
states:
...the soul
must be in the whole body [and therefore not
just in the brain], and in each part thereof ...for
to the nature of the species belongs what the
definition signifies; and in natural things, the
definition does not signify the form only, but
the form and the matter...so it belongs to
the notion of man [defini [definition] to be composed
of soul, flesh and bones.43(emphasis
added)
These philosophical precisions force at least two
major questions on any of the several types of
Aristotlean/Thomistic frameworks used in these
debates. First, if it is claimed that the "rational"
soul -- which "organizes and directs embryological
development" -- is not infused until about the third
month,44then
what explains the specifically human
organization of the human embryo and human fetus up
to that point? Hasn't the work of this supposed
"delayed rational soul" already been done --
as empirically verified? If so, then this biological
evidence of specifically human organization which we
do empirically observe must be accounted for by the
presence of the human soul right from the beginning.
In addition to the specifically human structural
organization from the beginning, we also empirically
observe specifically human functions and activities
from the beginning -- e.g., the production of
specifically human proteins, enzymes, etc. If so,
then this biological evidence of specifically human
functions and activities which we do empirically
observe must be accounted for by the presence of the
human soul right from the beginning.
Second, for both Aristotle and Thomas the
"rational soul", or more properly, power, includes virtually the veg the vegetative and sensitive
powers,45 and
for neither is there such a thing as a "rational
soul" alone, or even a whole soul alone -- or a
whole soul without a body (except in some sections
of the De Anima). The whole existing human
complex (body and soul -- and for Thomas, esse)
must be present together at once.
Apart from the biological and conceptual
absurdity of an "intermediate man" walking down the
street, if there were only a "vegetative" soul
present at first, how do we explain the production
of specifically human enzymes and proteins --
instead of carrot or corn enzymes -- from the very
start? If there were only a "vegetative and
sensitive" soul present, how do we explain the
production of specifically human tissue and organs
-- instead of only giraffe or gorilla organs and
systems? If the human soul cannot be split (and must
contain all three powers at once), and if
specifically human enzymes, proteins, tissues,
organs and structures are empirically observed --
which they are -- then the human rational soul must
be present at the very beginning along with the
human vegetative and sensitive "powers" (not
"parts") of the human soul. And this "soul" -- or,
more properly, these powers -- must exist as a
composite with the human body which it is organizing
and whose functions and activities it is directing
from the moment of fertilization -- which we know
empirically.
Thus, atThus, at fertilization, I would argue, the
"matter" (i.e., the newly combined fertilized ovum
or embryonic single-cell zygote) is already
appropriately organized as human -- since we
empirically observe it as specifically human and as
developing humanly from the beginning.46
So far the scientific facts and the philosophical
concepts match. At this point I want to take a
closer look at the biological facts after
fertilization, i.e., those of human embryological
growth and development. Along the way I will point
out several other different biological "marker
events" of personhood which have been variously
argued by others. All of these writers will make a
real distinction between a human being and a human
person -- supposedly based on these biological
marker events. The use of certain biological data
which they will use to support their arguments will
also be addressed. (The use of their problematic
philosophies with mind/body splits, which seem to be
imposed upon their problematic biological facts,
will be discussed later in this paper).
B. Zero - 14-days
As noted above, the newly formed single-cell
embryonic human zygote consists of 46 chromosomes
and non-nuclear DNA in which are coded the specific
directions for virtually all of the processes of
embryological development. The content of this
initial pool of genetic information never changes
throughout embryological development.
(1) Yet (1) Yet it has been argued by Bedate,
Cefalo47
and Bole,48
for example (Fig. 1), that not all of the
"information" needed is present in this single
original cell, that some of the information comes
from "molecular information" in later stages of
development, and some even comes from "molecules"
originating from the mother. Thus they conclude that
the original human zygote does not contain all of
the "information" needed to be a self-directing,
human individual, and therefore it is not a human
person.
I would question this biological data. First,
"molecular information" or "positional information"
is not the same as genetic (chromosomal)
information. Yet they seem to gloss over this very
important scientific distinction, and imply that the
two are the same. Second, "molecular information"
itself is coded in the original single-cell human
zygote. As the embryologist Moore discusses at great
length, the genetic information in the original
human zygote determines what "molecular information"
will be formed, which in turn determine what
proteins and enzymes will be formed, which determine
which tissues and organs will be formed. In genetics
this is called the "ding"
effect.49
That is, the information in the original single-cell
embryonic human zygote "cascades" throughout
embryological development -- each previous direction
causing the specific formation of each succeeding
direction. Thus, all "positional" or "molecular"
information or direction is already determined
itself by the information which preceded it, and
ultimately by the original genetic information in
the single-cell human zygote.50
Third, although the genetic information in the
human zygote may direct the absorption of molecules
from the mother, that hardly means that the maternal
molecules or the mother herself determines the very
nature of the growing embryo or fetus which she is
merely nurturing. (This argument is also rejected by
Suarez51).
The nature of the embryo or fetus, as is empirically
known, is determined by the formal biological
genetic make-up of the zygote from which he or she
continuously develops; and the directing of this
absorption of maternal molecules is done by the
genetic information within the embryo or fetus --
not by the mother or any genetic or "molecular"
information from the mother.52
Those are simply the correct biological facts. As
Jerome Lejeune, the internationally prominent prize
winning geneticist has testified:
... [E]ach of us
has a unique beginning, the moment of conception...
As soon as the twenty three chromosomes carried by
the sperm encounter the twenty-three chromosomes
carried by the ovum, the whole information
necessary and sufficient to spell out all the
characteristics of the new being is gathered...
(W)hen this information carried by the sperm and by
the ovum has encountered each other, then a new
human being is defined which has never occurred
before and will never occur again.... [the zygote,
and the cells produced in the succeeding divisions]
is not just simply a non-descript cell, or a
"population" or loose "collection" of cells, but a
very specialized individual, i.e., someone who will
build himself according to his own rule."53
(emphasis added)
Finally, Bedate and Cefalo54
also argue that the developing embryo can give rise
to biological entities which are not human beings,
e.g., hydatidiform moles and teratomas. But
hydatidiform moles and teratomas do not arise from
genetically normal human embryos, but from abnormal
entities (usually caused, e.g., by dispermy), which
are not therefore genetically normal human beings to
begin with.55
Again, he says:
(2) Next, it is argued by some that this original
single cell divides neatly first into 2 cells, then
into 4 cells, then into 8 cells, etc.56
This biological data too is questionable, (and
has consequences in understanding the argument about
"totipotency"). As known and published in human
embryology textbooks for over 60 years (as
Lejeune57 points
out), human embryogenesis immediately following
fertilization is asynchronous (unlike amphibian or
mouse embryology). The original single cell divides
into 2 cells -- and then only one of those cells
divides, giving 3 cells . After a time the other
cell divides, making it 4 cells, and then 8 cells,
etc.
Part of what happens at this three-cell stage is
that one can observe empirically the process of
methylation. This observation is important
philosophically. Many argue that these very early
cells -- including the original single-cell zygote
up to the 8-cell stage -- are
"totipotent".58
They explain totipotent cells as the most vaguely
directed and least differentiated cells in all of
embryological development. Each cell, they claim, is
not yet determined enough to be classified as an
individual human being or a part of an individual
human being. These cells, they say, have not yet
"made up their minds" what they want to be. They can
become any number of things. These cells are not
differentiated or specialized enough yet. What
happens in early development, they claim, is that
there is a gradual change from total
unspecialization to greater and greater
specialization or differentiation. For example, at
first we have a cell that could become any kind of
human cell. Progressively a cell becomes specialized
so that it can only become a kidney cell, or a
stomach cell, or a muscle cell, i.e., it becomes
more and more determined and differentiated.
This portrayal of differentiation is backwards,
as Lejeune notes. The original single-cell human
zygote is the most determined and specialized cell
in all of embryological development. Progressively
he or she loses, in fact, the ability to use
information. A kidney cell, for example, contains
virtually all of the genetic information that was in
the original single human zygote cell, but can now
use only a small portion of that information. So the
kidney cell has not lost any of this information --
only the ability to use it. This ability to use or
not use the information that is present is partially
determined by the process of methylation (which
itself is coded in the original single-cell zygote).
Through methylation and other processes during
embryogenesis, genes are turned on or turned off.
When the cell wants to control the use of cellular
information, it methylates a molecule to silence
that gene, to block or stop its use at a certain
point in development. No information is
progressively lost; only its use is lost. Thus a
specialized kidney cell cannot be prodded to become
an entirely new human being -- not because it does
not have all of the necessary information (it does),
but because all of the information other than that
of being a "kidney cell" has been methylated, or
silenced.59
Thus to be so differentiated as a kidney cell is
actually a negative in such arguments. The kidney
cell cannot direct anything but a small minuscule
part of the development of the human embryo or
fetus; whereas the original single-cell human zygote
contains and can use all of the genetic information
only partially used by the later cells. So there is
nothing vague, undirected or undecided about it. It
is the human zygote which represents the greatest
fullness of human content and useable information,
of directedness and decisive action -- more than
that found in any of the later cells. The human
zygote will "decide" what reactions and formations
take place. He or she will direct all of the
processes and formations during the entire
embryological process.60
Furthermore, "totipotency" is even suppose to happen
-- it is a normal part of human embryogenesis, and
is indeed encoded in the original genetic
information of the human zygote. Differentiation is
also encoded in the original human zygote, and is
partly explained by methylation. Differentiation,
then, really represents the restricted ability to
make any "decisions".
(3) Next, Suarez argues for the 2-cell stage,
with, as he claims, the completion of the first
division and of the genetic input. "The two-cell
stage already is, like the adult, a moment in the
execution of the program 'man'". And besides, he
argues, the two-cell stage is already the same
living being as the human adult arising from
it.61
However, we already know that the genetic input is
complete at the single-cell zygote stage, and that
the zygote in fact is the source of the genetic
input of the two-cell stage and is the same living
being as both the two-cell stage and the adult
stage. Thus Suarez's own argument actually argues
for personhood for the zygote rather than for his
two-cell stage.
(4) But to continue, the cells will proceed to
divide until about 5 or 6 days, when two cell layers
are formed in the blastocyst -- the trophoblast or
outer cell layer, and the embryoblast or inner cell
layer. Some writers, such as Grobstein and
McCormick, have stated that this stage is
significant because they can demonstrate empirically
that there can be no true human individual present
at this time -- we have only a genetic individual,
not a developmental individual. A person can be
present, they claim, only if there is a
developmental individual -- and this cannot take
place until 14-days:
I contend in this
paper that the moral status -- and
specifically the controversial issue of personhood
is related to the attainment of developmental
individuality (being the source of one
individual)... It should be noted that at the zygote
stage the genetic individual is not yet
developmentally single -- a source of only one
individual. As we will see, that does not occur
until a single body axis has begun to form, near the
end of the second week post fertilization
when implantation is underway.62
(emphasis added)
It is to be noted that the moral status of the
developing human being explicitly hinges directly on
what developmental stage he or she is at. Note also
that they make implantation (5-7 days) co-extensive
with two weeks (when the primitive streak begins to
form) -- also scientifically incorrect.
But to continue, these early cells, they claim,
are only "collections" of undifferentiated,
"totipotent" cells, and they name them, or designate
them collectively, as only comprising a
"pre-embryo" (a term, by the way, which is
specifically rejected by human
embryologists63
-- only amphibian and mouse embryologists,
philosophers, theologians and bioethicists use the
term). Further, the term was rejected by the judge
in the Davis vs Davis frozen embryo case.
The scientific facts which they give to support
these claims are the following. They claim that only
the cells from the inner layer of the blastocyst
(the embryoblast), eventually become the adult human
being. The cells from the outer trophoblast layer,
they write, are all discarded after birth as the sac
and the umbilical cord, etc. Thus, developmentally,
the implication is, that we are not dealing
exclusively with those "important cells" which will
become the adult human being, i.e., the embryoblast,
but rather a mixture of "essential" and
"non-essential" cells, i.e., a PRE-embryo. A
pre-embryo, then, is not a human person, yet:
This multicellular entity, called a
blastocyst, has an outer cellular wall, a
central fluid-filled cavity and a small
gathering of cells at one end known as the inner
cell mass. Developmental studies show that the
cells of the outer wall become the trophoblast
(feeding layer) and are precursors to the later
placenta. Ultimately, all these cells are
discarded at birth64(emphasis
added)
But, again, these scientific "facts" are
questionable, and necessarily lead to questionable
philosophical concepts. It simply is not true that
all of the cells from the trophoblast layer are
discarded after birth and do not contribute cells to
the inner cell layer; nor is it true that only the
cells from the inner layer become the later adult or
that none of the cells from the inner cell layer
contribute to the outer layer. As can be found in
virtually all embryology texts, including Moore's
text from which they quote, many of the cells from
this trophoblast layer become an integral and
essential part of the constitution of the later
fetus, newborn and adult human being. For example,
the cells from the trophoblast layer known as the
yolk sac cells become part of the adult gut. And
cells known as the allantois cells become part of
the adult ligaments, blood cells and urinary
bladder.65
Thus these "scientific" facts used by Grobstein
and McCormick are scientifically incorrect -- and
therefore so also are their philosophical
conclusions about "pre-embryos" and "developmental
individuals" which are grounded on those incorrect
scientific facts.
Yet McCormick and Grobstein continue. It is
impossible, they claim, for a human person to be
present until at least the 14-day marker event, at
which point the primitive streak forms in the
embryo. The philosophical significance of this
marker, it is claimed, is that until the formation
of the primitive streak it is possible for twinning
to take place. The totipotent cells "do not yet know
whether to be one or two individuals". After
14-days, they claim, twinning is not possible, and
thus the organism is finally determinately
developmentally one individual -- an essential
pre-requisite for personhood.66
But, again, this science is incorrect. As Karen
Dawson67points
out in these debates -- and as is found in every
human genetics textbook -- it is possible for
monozygotic twinning to take place after 14-days and
the formation of the primitive streak. For example,
fetus-in-fetu twins can be formed up to 2 and 3
months after fertilization, and Siamese twins even
later. Also, it is known that "twinning" is
sometimes genetically determined and coded in the
original human single-cell zygote (as, indeed, is
totipotency and differentiation).
There is nothing magical, it turns out, about
this 14-day stage as far as the concept of
individuality and personhood is concerned. (Even the
Warnock Report, which encouraged the use of the term
"pre-embryo", admitted that the 14-day marker event
or any other was totally arbitrary, as did the NIH
Human Embryo Research Panel).68
If a 2-cell, 8-cell, implantation stage, 14-day
primitive streak stage embryo or 4 month fetus
splits into twins, that simply means that the
original entity was one individual -- and now there
are simply two individuals. The fact of twinning
says nothing about the individuality of the first
individual, i.e., the single-cell human
zygote.69
Indeed, the history of all living organisms is of
one individual giving rise to another individual --
but one would certainly not then conclude that there
were therefore no individuals ever present, or that
the former individual was hopelessly "undecided".
C. Ward Kischer, a human embryologist, argues
that the scientific data of McCormick and Grobstein
is highly selective and that they leave out a
majority of other relevant data:
It is not a
question as to whether science can or cannot decide
the question of personhood. Science is not
interested in deciding personhood. However, if the
socio-legal status of personhood cannot be decided
without invoking what is known scientifically, then
the whole of scientific data should be used and
not arbitrarily selected bits and pieces of data.
(emphasis in original)
... Human
embryology is now in danger of being rewritten as a
stratagem statement of current socio-legal, but also
of late, even theological issues. Unless the
errors are corrected now, we will be in danger of
entering a protracted period of false concepts
concerning our own development.70
Unfortunately, Grobstein later publicly admitted
before a scientific conference that he had knowingly
substituted amphibian embryology for human
embryology.71
Yet this "science" continues to be promoted. For
example, there are the claims by Robertson (a
lawyer) that "personhood" is only a social construct
and that the early human embryo has only "symbolic
value" to the parents and society.72
But Robertson bases his argument almost exclusively
and exhaustively on the "embryology" of Grobstein,
even in his court cases. And recently, the N.I.H.
Human Embryo Research Panel issued its
Recommendations to the Director of N.I.H. Ron Greene
and Carol Tauer, the Ethics Co-Chairpersons of that
Panel, grounded the "reduced moral status" of the
early human embryo on the published work of
Grobstein and McCormick, and most of the writers
considered here73
-- concluding that certain kinds of destructive
experimental research could ethically be performed
on these early live human embryos because of their
"reduced moral status".
Furthermore, certain pharmaceutical companies
have argued that the F.D.A. should allow them to
market oral contraceptives because there is "no
embryo there until two weeks", and therefore their
product is not abortifacient. Their source for this
scientific claim is the Australian theologian Fr.
Norman Ford's book (below), grounded on the
"science" of Grobstein and McCormick.74
Obviously, if Grobstein's embryology is
incorrect, then Robertson's argument, the N.I.H.'s
Recommendations, and the claims by the
pharmaceutical industry and advocates which are all
based on Grobstein's "embryology" are also invalid.
(5)Ford75
also argues for the 14-day stage, based primarily on
the same science from Grobstein, although Ford
claims there is an individual present at
fertilization -- but it is only a biological
individual. Rational ensoulment cannot take place
until after 14 days, at which point there is, he
claims, an ontological individual, i.e., when
differentiation is completed and there is a distinct
individuality.76But
aside from the problems with the science of
Grobstein and McCormick on which Ford basis his own
conclusions, we know empirically that complete
differentiation does not actually take place until
well after birth. As the embryologist Moore states:
Human development
is a continuous process that begins when an
ovum from a female is fertilized by a sperm from a
male. Growth and differentiation transform
the zygote, a single cell formed by the union of the
ovum and the sperm, into a multicellular adult human
being. Most developmental changes occur during the
embryonic and the fetal periods, but important
changes also occur during the other periods of
development: childhood, adolescence, and
adulthood... Although it is customary to divide
development into prenatal and postnatal periods, it
is important to realize that birth is merely a
dramatic event during development resulting in a
distinct change in environment. Development does not
stop at birth: important developmental changes, in
addition to growth, occur after birth... Most
developmental changes are completed by the age of
25.77(emphasis
added)
Obviously, then, a 14-day embryo is nowhere near
being "completely differentiated". Once again, the
incorrect science on which a philosophical claim is
based actually negates the validity of that
philosophical claim.
C. After 14-days
(1) Sometimes Wallace,78
too, wants to argue for 14-days, but he is
inconsistent and seems more to argue for a point
after 14-days. He bases his own position on what he
calls an "Aristotelean-Thomistic" theory of "natural
law". This "natural law theory" grounds his
distinction between transient natures (or seeds, or
beings-on-the-way) as applied dubiously and
analogously to the transition from plant, animal, to
human natures during human embryological
development; and stable natures, as applied to the
actual embryological development of individual
systems of plants, animals and human beings. This
"transition" from plant, animal to human substances
during human embryological development for Wallace
is, then, actually a series of substantial changes
within human embryogenesis itself; and once again he
bases much of his argument on the science of
Grobstein and McCormick, and a rather neo-Platonic
rendition of Aristotle and Aquinas, as well as a
distinctively physicist's rendition of "science".
Two points out of many which are problematic are
his descriptions of his "Aristotelean-Thomistic"
grounding, and the blatant contradictions in his
analogies. First, Wallace subscribes to the
Aristotle of the historically problematic De
Anima, and attributes to both Aristotle and
Thomas a theory of the "eduction" of these
substantial forms from "proto-matter", substantial
forms which Aristotle, he says, would call
"natures", and which Thomas, he says, would define
as (quantity + proto-matter) -- a definition of
substance with which neither Aristotle-proper nor
Thomas would agree. Wallace renames this as
"mass-energy", to bring Aristotle and Thomas "up to
date with modern physics".79
However, Wallace is really elucidating a very
neo-Platonic interpretation of both Aristotle and
Thomas, one with which neither the historic
Aristotle nor Thomas can be reconciled. Neither of
them gave any real existence to "proto-matter", or
what I think Wallace confuses with "prime matter".
And, indeed, for both of them "prime matter" was
only a conceptual construct, and by definition, was
totally without forms80--
in fact, that was the whole point! As Klubertanz
states:
Of itself, prime
matter is not actually any kind of thing;
nor does it have quantity, or any kind of
qualities or other accidents. Hence prime matter
cannot exist in itself; it cannot be found as
such in direct or indirect sense experience; it
cannot even be understood separately from substance
or substantial form. It is an intelligible
co-principle...81(emphasis
added)
Thus no substantial forms can be educed from
"proto-matter" for either Aristotle or Thomas,
because there were no forms there to begin with. And
Thomas, like Aristotle, actually argued against this
sort of theory:
Creation does not
mean the building up of a composite thing from
pre-existing principles; but it means that the
composite is created so that it is brought into
being at the same time with all its principles.82(emphasis
added)
Further, "quantity" for both Aristotle and Thomas
was an accident of substance, not a concrete
substance itself.83
Thus neither would even equate their "quantity" with
the modern concept of "mass". And finally, Wallace
also never once includes esse (the act of
existing) -- which is the hallmark of Thomas'
definition of any existing substance -- in any of
the definitions of "substance" which he attributes
to Thomas. In fact, he simply never mentions esse
at all.
Second, his concept of "transient natures" is
drawn from rather shaky chemistry and biology. He
claims, for example, that when Na and Cl react
together they each actually change their natures.
But Na and Cl are only sharing electrons, not
protons (which determine the "nature" or kind of
element it is, and which place the element in a
specific place in the periodic chart). He also fails
to mark the critical differences between the nuclei
of radio-isotopes and those of living cells. Nor
does he mark the critical differences which
distinguish the generation of a radioisotope from
that of a plant; nor that of an animal from that of
a human being. He also builds a "model" of what he
calls "transient natures", yet admits that they
probably are really "stable natures"! Inexplicably
he will call them "transient natures"
anyway.84
He then applies his own theory of transient natures,
questionable even to himself -to plant and animal
generation -- all the while acknowledging that real
plants and real animals have stable natures which
are descriptive of the mature individuals only --
not to the developmental stages of those
individuals.85
How credible is such a theory? Should it be applied
to determine the real moral status of real live
human beings?
(2) A final marker event I will point out is 8
weeks or several time-markers after that (Fig. 2) --
although there are many others with equally
troubling science invoked. Personhood, it is
claimed, does not begin until the dawning of or the
maturation of the physical substrate of human
consciousness, self-consciousness, or sentience --
i.e., the nervous system and/or the brain. Indeed,
there is already a movement by some in legal
jurisprudence to formalize the legal concept of
"brain birth" to denote that point in time
biologically when there is present a "person", as a
parallel to the already legal criteria of "brain
death".
One well-known criticism of this claim comes from
Gareth Jones, who rejects scientific claims that we
can determine the biological point of either
"rational attributes" or sentience. As he states,
the parallelism between brain death and brain birth
is scientifically invalid. Brain death is the
gradual or rapid cessation of the functions of a
brain. Brain birth is the very gradual acquisition
of the functions of a developing neural system. This
developing neural system is not a brain. He
questions, in fact, the entire assumption and asks
what neurological reasons there might be for
concluding that an incapacity for consciousness
becomes a capacity for consciousness once this point
is passed. Jones continues that the alleged symmetry
is not as strong as is sometimes assumed, and that
it has yet to be provided with a firm biological
base.86
A different Jones who is partaking in these debates
makes the following poignant remark:
The reproductive
biologist cannot assign moral status to the sperm or
the egg or the fertilized egg or any of the
subsequent products that may result from this fusion
... The reproductive biologist can help, however, by
assuring that other scientists or those who wish
to assert a moral status, and use a biological
term or concept to do so, know what they are
talking about!87(emphasis
added)
Furthermore, the empirical fact is that complete
physiological brain integration is not complete
until many months or years after birth,88
just as the complete exercising of "rational
attributes" is not possible until years after
birth.89
Empirically this would extend their biological
marker for personhood into early adulthood (and thus
the moral status as well).
IV. PHILOSOPHICAL DEFINITIONS OF "PERSONHOOD"
I could continue, biologically, down any number
of "marker events" where it is argued at different
points during biological development that until that
point there is only a human being and only after
that point there is a human person. But virtually
every single marker event claimed is also using
extremely problematic scientific "data" to back up
their philosophical claims of personhood. It would
seem that there is more of a problem here than
simply the use of incorrect science. Perhaps there
is also involved -- whether consciously or not --
the imposition on that incorrect science of certain
characteristically problematic philosophical
presuppositions. What I see is the use of specific
metaphysical and anthropological presuppositions
which result in a classic mind/body -- or even
sometimes a body/body split -- that are imposed upon
the scientific data.
A rough consideration of just how different
philosophical schools of thought have defined a
"human being" or a "human person", then, is in
order. Especially in light of the obvious biological
continuity present throughout the entire course of
embryological development, as well as the
specifically human development which we know
empirically takes place, how adequately do the
various philosophical definitions of a human person
reflect the correct biological facts as we
empirically know them?
I will focus on the definition that is most
generally agreed upon these days, i.e., one that is
basically "derived" from Descartes90or
Locke.91Generally,
a human person is someone who is actually acting at
the time in a rational manner (Fig. 3). That is, he
or she is self-conscious, self-aware, competent,
autonomous, logical, mature, conversant, and
interacts with the environment and other rational
beings around him or her. In short, if one is acting
rationally one is a person. If this is true, then
99% of the possible examples of human persons I gave
you at the beginning of this paper are -- by
definition -- not persons. Those examples include
the mentally ill and retarded, drug and alcohol
addicts, patients with Parkinson's and Alzheimer's
diseases, and the comatose (medical conditions which
especially affect a considerable percentage of the
elderly population).
This is the sort of philosophical definition that
in fact has been used for many years by writers such
as Engelhardt,92Tooley,93Kuhse94and
Singer95
(yes, the animal rights person) who argue in the
literature for infanticide of even normal healthy
infants. If, they argue, a normal new-born baby
cannot act rationally (as described above), then it
is not a "subject" but only an "object" -- and we
can therefore use it in destructive experimental
research if we rational agents so chose. In Singer's
own words:
Now it must be
admitted that these arguments apply to the newborn
baby as much as to the fetus. A week-old baby is
not a rational and self-conscious being, and
there are many non-human animals whose rationality,
self-consciousness, awareness, capacity to feel pain
(sentience), and so on, exceed that of a human baby
a week, a month, or even a year old. If the fetus
does not have the same claim to life as a person, it
appears that the newborn baby is of less value
than the life of a pig, a dog, or a
chimpanzee.96
(emphasis added)
And philosopher Richard Frey (presently a Senior
Scholar at the Hastings Center), pushing Singer's
logic (correctly) one step further, suggests that
mentally ill human beings are therefore also not
"persons", and therefore they might be used in
purely destructive experimental research in place of
the higher animals who are "persons".97
Would you agree that the killing of normal
healthy human infants, or the substitution of
mentally ill human beings for the higher animals in
destructive experimental research, is morally
justifiable? If not, then we have to question, at
least, such very rationalistic definitions of a
human person, and the metaphysical and
epistemological foundations on which they are
grounded. If one argues from the rationalistic
premise that a "human person" is defined only in
terms of active "reason" (or only the rational part
of the soul), and if only normal older children or
adults exhibit such active "rational attributes",
then even a normal newborn infant, or a 15-year old
child is not a person -- and to be logically
consistent, you must agree with Singer's or
Engelhardt's arguments for infanticide, and with
Frey's conclusions about the mentally ill in
research. To be even more logically consistent, you
might also have to agree that my partial list of
human beings who are not presently exercising their
"rational attributes" could also be used for the
"greater good" in experimental research, be denied
medical help or costs, or be euthanized.98
After all, these populations of human beings have a
"reduced moral status" -- they are no longer human
persons -- no longer "subjects", but "objects".99
On the other hand, sometimes a "human person" is
defined only in terms of the whole soul -- i.e., the
vegetative, sensitive and rational "souls" all
together. Once this soul unites with a body, we then
have a human person. It doesn't matter, they say,
whether this person is presently acting rationally.
What is important is that the rational nature or
capacity is present. But if we think about it, we
run into similar problems as mentioned earlier. If
there are no vegetative, sensitive, or rational
directions injected until about 3 months -- how did
a specifically human biochemical, tissue, organ
system get built before 3 months?
Or perhaps we should restrict ourselves to a
purely material definition of a "human person". The
human person is simply a complex system of
molecules, tissues and organs. But this definition
has continuously failed in explaining our experience
of thoughts, ideas, and concepts, and especially of
intentionality, willing, or choosing. It is argued
that a "person" is simply a more advanced
sophisticated phase of a material complex human
being. But aren't we really talking then about a
secondary or accidental quality? Surely the
definition of the nature of a human person should
not be put in terms of only a secondary or
accidental phase -- however sophisticated it may be.
And again, if you are arguing from the materialist
premise that a "human person" is defined only in
terms of sentience, or the physical integration or
functioning of the brain, then you will also have to
argue for infanticide -- or worse (as already
indicated), because as pointed out, full brain
integration and sentience is also not completed
until over the age of 20 years, and paraplegics,
stroke victims, advanced diabetics, and the comatose
often cannot optimally feel pain.
Finally, there are some who would follow the
long-discredited "scientific" theory that any
individual instance of embryogenesis "recapitulates"
the historical evolution of the species (e.g., that
there is the formation of ancestral "gills" or
"tails" during the embryogenesis of a single human
embryo, somehow "recapitulating" the evolution of
all of the species). Such "theories" are still
attractive, especially to evolutionists, and to some
"process" philosophers and theologians -- leading
again to a theory of delayed hominization.
However, these claims were based on scientific
myths (the best they could do at the time) which
have long since been discarded scientifically. There
is no empirical evidence that the "gills" or "tails"
of primitive animals are really formed during any
individual embryogenesis of a single human embryo,
and such theories are rejected (if discussed at all)
even in human embryology text books. Such claims
fail to make a real distinction between the
historical process of the evolution of millions of
different species (which takes place over millions
of years) and the mere growth and development of a
single individual human being within one species
(which takes only nine months). In short, it
confuses a "species" with an individual. As
O'Rahilly succinctly puts it:
The theory that
successive stages of individual development
(ontogeny) correspond with ("recapitulate")
successive adult ancestors in the line of
evolutionary descent (phylogeny) became popular in
the 19th century as the so-called biogenetic law.
This theory of recapitulation, however, has had a
"regrettable influence on the progress of
embryology" [citing de Beer]... Furthermore,
during its development an animal departs more and
more from the form of other animals. Indeed, the
early stages in the development of an animal are not
like the adult stages of other forms, but resemble
only the early stages of those
animals.100
Could "process" scientists, philosophers and
theologians be imposing their philosophical
presuppositions on the individual processes of human
embryogenesis? Does every individual process imply
evolution? Just because there is a process does not
mean that there is no individual there or that the
very nature of that individual is changing during
that process. Consider the life-long process of
growth and development (embryo, fetus, infant,
child, adult, elderly) which any individual human
being goes through. Just because there is a process
taking place does not mean that there is no
individual human being who retains his/her own
nature throughout that process.
At any rate, if "recapitulation" were true, then
we would also observe the formation of "fish" or
"monkey" enzymes, proteins and tissues, which we
don't. Even though there are many genes we do share
in common with other species, let's not forget about
the genes we do not share with them and which make
us specifically human and different from them.
Once again, consider the legitimacy of the
fundamental groundings on which so-called "process"
scientific, philosophical or theological theories
are based. Who is to say that any particular
"rendition" of that "process" is either sound or
valid to begin with. Can any such proponent
successfully prove the validity of his or her
"process" theory, or successfully defend it? Could
such a "calculus" be arbitrary or abused? And once
again consider the logical and practical conclusions
to which one must be pushed if "moral status" is
merely grounded on a "calculus of process".
Literally no human beings contained within that
process would be left untouched or unaffected.
The political and cultural impact of such
incorrect scientific and philosophical definitions
(or redefinitions) of "personhood" is potentially
devastating. As Judge Robert Bork has so succinctly
and brilliantly comprehended and demonstrated, such
"logic", the scientific and philosophical premises
on which they rest, and many of the several radical
libertine and egalitarian agendas which have been
derived from them, are pushing us ever more rapidly
towards what he describes as "Gomorrah", the final
stage or end point of the living, breathing
political and cultural Slope on which we have
already been and continue to be rapidly Slipping.
Such "theories" or social "constructs", which
inherently debase the inalienable value of newly
existing unborn human lives, are now being tapped to
ground the politically correct and absolutized
concepts of "autonomy", perceived "social needs" and
"convenience". The political and cultural
consequences which he so carefully and at
considerable length develops should give us
immediate pause:
The systematic
killing of unborn children in huge numbers is part
of a general disregard for human life that has been
growing for some time. Abortion by itself did not
cause that disregard, but it certainly deepens and
legitimates the nihilism that is spreading in our
culture and finds killing for convenience
acceptable. We are crossing lines, at first
slowly and now with rapidity: killing unborn
children for convenience; removing tissue from live
fetuses; contemplating creating embryos for
destruction in research; considering taking organs
from living anencephalic babies; experimenting with
assisted suicide; and contemplating euthanasia.
Abortion has coarsened us. If it is permissible to
kill the unborn human for convenience, it is surely
permissible to kill those thought to be soon to die
for the same reason. And it is inevitable that many
who are not in danger of imminent death will be
killed to relieve their families of burdens.
Convenience is becoming the theme of our culture.
Humans tend to be inconvenient at both ends of their
lives.101(emphasis
added)
V. QUESTIONS ABOUT PROFESSIONAL "EXPERTISE"
Perhaps this is an appropriate point to at least
raise the ticklish and often ignored question of
both scientific and philosophical "expertise".102
It is clear from even the few arguments presented
here that there are serious problems with both the
scientific and philosophical inaccuracies pervading
these arguments on "personhood".
The science used is often selective, cryptic
and/or simply incorrect, and does not apply to or is
irrelevant to the philosophical issue it is trying
to ground. Some still insist that the "science"
being used is correct -- although certainly to so
"insist" does not make it so. We would all welcome
those who support such "scientific" claims to prove
them. When all of the human embryological, human
genetic and other scientific texts -- as well as the
most recent research and assurances by the most
respected researchers -- state clearly and
unequivocally that very different basic scientific
facts are universally acknowledged which actually
contradict the scientific "facts" used by many of
the proponents of delayed personhood, let those
proponents defend their scientific "facts" openly
and publicly before an open body of their scientific
peers.
What human embryologist, for example, would agree
that ova and sperms are really the same as zygotes;
that the zygote is not a human being or human
embryo; that the early human embryo or fetus is just
a "piece" of the mother's tissues; that human cells
divide asynchronously and neatly into two, four, 8,
etc.; that all of the cells at the two-cell stage
are completely differentiated; that "totipotency" is
somehow problematic, vague, or "indecisive"; that
"molecular molecules" from the mother actually
determine the very nature of the developing human
embryo; that hydatidiform moles or teratomas derive
from normal human embryos; that scientifically there
is any such thing as a "pre-embryo", a
"developmental individual" or an "ontological
individual"; that none of the cells from the
trophoblast layer ever find their way into the fetus
or even the adult human being -- or that none of the
cells from the embryoblast layer ever find their way
into the placenta, etc.; that twinning never takes
place after 14-days; that implantation takes place
at two weeks; that the physical brain is parallel to
the physical nervous system or primitive nerve
network, or that either is fully integrated by the
eighth week; or that full sentience or rational
attributes are present anytime before birth (or
beyond)?
What chemist would agree that the sharing of
electrons when Na and Cl combine changes the very
natures of these elements, or that the nucleus of a
radioisotope is physically or chemically analogous
to the nucleus of a living plant or animal cell?
Such basic scientific inaccuracies are
academically difficult to explain.103
Why don't other scientists publicly or privately
refute such scientific mis-information? Might they
lose much needed research grants if they did? At
what point does such scientific mis-information
become unethical -- especially when it degrades and
corrupts these very sciences, and is then applied
and used to determine the moral status of certain
human beings?
The philosophy that is often invoked is just as
selective and problematic. Sometimes the
"philosopher" apparently has had no background in
the history of philosophy, and seems to be totally
(or conveniently) oblivious to the theoretical
problems inherent in any philosophical position with
a mind/body split, or with rationalistic or
empiricist philosophical presuppositions. Nor does
there seem to be the least awareness that these
philosophies are not really viable -- but
interesting today mostly from an historical or
propadeutic perspective, i.e., examples of how such
systems historically have failed. Sometimes an
historical philosopher is depicted with gross
imprecision, or completely out of context -- making
that historical philosopher "say" things he never
would or could conclude to.
There is no way many "quotes" from Aristotle,
Aquinas or Descartes can be sustained academically.
And it is hardly a new academic insight that the
Aristotle of the De Anima is and has been
(for centuries) highly problematic and contradictory
to his main-stream metaphysical doctrines on
substance and anthropology.104
Nor did Aristotle or Thomas even mention
"proto-matter", and both argued that "prime matter"
doesn't even really exist. Neither would have
defined "substance" as "mass-energy"; nor equated
"quantity" with "mass". And Thomas would have always
included esse in his definition of any
"substance". Nor are the proper academic
distinctions made among the several different kinds
of Thomists (e.g., neo-platonic, aristotelean,
suarezian, transcendental, maritainian, rahnerian,
process, etc.,105many
of whom read St. Thomas differently and conclude to
different theories on these issues.
Descartes' philosophy was abandoned hundreds of
years ago because of its multitudinous theoretical
problems -- not only because of its mind/body split,
belief in innate ideas and that there were only two
substances in the entire universe (Mind and
Extension), and neo-platonic epistemology -- but
also because of the blatantly erroneous and absurd
scientific theories to which it led (e.g., his
theory of the "vortex").106
These basic philosophical are likewise difficult to
explain.107
Again, let the "philosophers" in these "personhood"
debates defend their philosophical positions with
their mind/body splits, as well as their historical
philosophical "depictions" and interpretations,
openly and publicly before a body of philosophical
scholars. Or would that be considered too
"uncollegeal"? At what point does "collegiality"
become unethical -- e.g., when it corrupts and
degrades the history of philosophy, and is then also
applied to determine the moral status of certain
human beings?
This observation has serious implications for the
assumed "professional" status of researchers,
philosophers, ethicists and bioethicists -- issues
which have received too little attention, especially
in light of the current movement of the theories of
these writers out of the "ivory towers" of academia
into the domain of public policy. Scientific,
philosophical, ethical or bioethical "experts" are
being used more and more as "expert witnesses" --
for example, in the media, courtrooms, Congressional
hearings, and federal panels -- to help to determine
health care and medical research issues in public
policy. It would seem that they should at least be
held to the same standards of professional activity
as are other "professionals" who have as significant
an impact on the public welfare. Interestingly,
these four "professions" are not even listed in the
Codes of Professional Responsibility108
-- although physicians are. I do not consider myself
an "expert" in any of these fields at all, and
surely I am fallible as well. But given their impact
on public policy, certainly there must be some bare
minimum of standards in these fields below which one
can not go without expecting to be held
professionally accountable.
As "food for thought", consider the
above-mentioned Codes. Among the criteria
used as standards for "professionals" in that work
are: accountability and responsibility; competence
and qualifications; education, training and
experience; law and legal requirements; licensing,
certification, and accreditation; and other codes,
bylaws, policies and technical standards -- to name
but a few. A glance down the list of "professions"
included under these standards of behavior reveals
some interesting examples:
1. Accountability and responsibility (p.
479): These professions state specific "codes of
professional conduct" or "codes of ethics":
accountants, arbitrators, architects, bankers,
business executives, clinical social workers,
counselors, dental hygienists, dentists,
engineers, financial planners, government
lawyers, hospitals, insurance agents,
journalists, lawyers, legal assistants,
lobbyists, mediators, neutrals, nurses,
personnel consultants, physicians, prosecutors,
psychiatrists, psychologists, public
administrators, real estate agents, social
workers, and trial lawyers.
Note that researchers, philosophers, ethicists
and bioethicists have no formal professional code of
ethics, and no formal professional standards of
behavior.
2. Competence and qualifications (pp.
485-486): These professions state specific
requirements which must be met before
practicing, including the mastery of a defined
body of knowledge and the attainment of
professional degrees which reflect similar
requirements; many require testing on local,
state or national levels: accountants,
advertising agencies, arbitrators, bankers,
business executives, clinical social workers,
counselors, dental hygienists, dentists, direct
marketers, engineers, financial planners,
hospitals, insurance agents, journalists, law
librarians, lawyers, legal assistants,
mediators, neutrals, nurses, physicians,
prosecutors, psychiatrists, psychologists,
public administrators, real estate agents,
social workers, and trial lawyers.
On the other hand, biological researchers are
allowed to use radioisotopes without having a course
in nuclear chemistry, or chemists are allowed to use
infectious microbes without having a course in
microbiology or sterile technique. Also, one finds
metaphysicians teaching bioethics with no previous
course work, ethicists teaching metaphysics with no
previous course work, and bioethicists teaching
metaphysics and ethics with no previous course work.
Wouldn't it be odd to find a lawyer teaching organic
chemistry with no previous course work in organic
chemistry? As someone once aptly put it, "you can't
teach what you don't know". And although
philosophers, ethicists, and bioethicists must meet
the idiosyncratic requirements of their degree
institutions, there are no local, state or national
testing requirements or standards to meet in order
to assure the public of any common degree of
competence or mastery of a similarly defined body of
knowledge.
3. Education, training and experience (p.
492): These professions go beyond the above
standards by requiring constant professional
up-dating of information under formal,
systematic conditions, as well as competence in
specific training and a clear demonstration of
effective experience: accountants, advertising
agencies, arbitrators, architects, bankers,
business executives, clinical social workers,
counselors, dental hygienists, dentists,
engineers, financial planners, hospitals,
insurance agents, journalists, law librarians,
lawyers, legal assistants, lobbyists, mediators,
neutrals, nurses, personnel consultants,
physicians, prosecutors, psychiatrists,
psychologists, public administrators, real
estate agents, social workers, and trial
lawyers.
Note that researchers are not required to take
courses in research ethics; nor do physicians or
nurses necessarily know how to do basic or clinical
research. Nor do philosophers, ethicists, or
bioethicists have uniform requirements for course
work, yet alone even agree on how to define the
subject-matters of their disciplines. There are no
requirements for updating their bodies of knowledge,
there are variable degrees and levels of post-degree
training -- if any -- and there are no determinable
formal and global professional oversights or
requirements for any experience.
Of particular interest is the fact that many
public policy issues discussed here (and others)
have been grounded on bioethics and its three basic
principles of autonomy, justice and beneficence ("principlism").109
But if "principlism" is no longer acknowledged as a
viable basis on which to ground even
bioethics,110
then how can all of those local, national and
international regulations, guidelines and documents
-- which were explicitly grounded on "principlism"
-- any longer be valid themselves?
4. Law and legal requirements (pp. 500-501):
These professions go even further and require
their members to practice their professions
within certain local, state and federal legal
requirements: accountants, advertising agencies,
arbitrators, architects, bankers, business
executives, clinical social workers, counselors,
dental hygienists, dentists, direct marketers,
engineers, financial planners, government
lawyers, hospitals, insurance agents,
journalists, law librarians, lawyers, legal
assistants, lobbyists, mediators, nurses,
personnel consultants, physicians, prosecutors,
psychiatrists, psychologists, public
administrators, real estate agents, social
workers, and trial lawyers.
There are virtually no local, state or federal
legal requirements restricting the practice of
philosophers, ethicists or bioethicists.
5. Licensing, certification and accreditation
(pp. 501-502): These professions require that
their members obtain local, state or federal
licensing, certification and/or accreditation
before they are even allowed to practice:
architects, clinical social workers, counselors,
dental hygienists, dentists, engineers,
financial planners, hospitals, insurance agents,
lawyers, legal assistants, mediators, nurses,
personnel consultants, physicians, prosecutors,
psychiatrists, psychologists, real estate
agents, and trial lawyers.
Although physicians and nurses are required to be
licensed as care givers, they are not required to be
licensed as clinical researchers; nor are bench
scientists required to be licensed to do basic
research. Clearly philosophers, ethicists and
bioethicists are not required to be licensed or
certified to practice on any local, state or federal
level.
In these times of specialization, many "insist" that
we must rely on the "professional expertise" of
others. But if this and other studies on the
arguments for "personhood" indicate anything, it is
that one still must question the kind of "expertise"
abounding today. If one prefers to propound a
scientific/philosophical/ethical/bioethical theory
that the world is made up of "quadrads" or "zeta
particles", for example, and that a human being is
defined in such terms, such a theory use to be
academically entertained "indulgently". But today,
when such theories are taught as fact to thousands
of students, and further incorporated into local,
state, national and international public policies
and guidelines which effect the health, welfare and
very lives of multi-millions of innocent human
beings, then such theories, as well as those who
espouse and promote them, ought to bear serious
accountability to the public who eventually bears
the brunt of such theoretical mis-information.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the scientific and philosophical problems
inherent in the positions which argue for the
various biological marker events of "personhood",
can we really accept their various conclusions? Can
we accept either the "science" that is used or the
rationalistic or empiricist philosophical
definitions of human beings or human persons which
are incorporated into those arguments? Or is it even
possible to reconcile the correct biological facts
with a philosophical definition of a human being or
a human person?
What I am leading to is a definition which does
not split the human being from the human person, and
which does not consist of only a part of the human
beings of which we have experience. Can you really
have a human person without simultaneously having a
human being? And vice-versa, can you really have a
human being without also simultaneously having a
human person?
I would argue no -- you really can't split them
-- except conceptually, as rationalistic or
empiricist philosophers are wont to do. But if you
do define a human person as only a part of the whole
complex -- i.e., only in terms of matter, or
sentience, or soul, or a part of the soul, or
rational attributes -- then you will also logically
have to argue not only for delayed hominization, but
for the infanticide of even normal healthy infants
or young adolescents, the substitution of the
mentally ill in destructive experimental research,
and the abuse and possible euthanizing of many sick
human beings (especially the elderly) as well. And
delayed hominization simply does not match up with
the correct empirical facts.
Philosophically what has occurred is that a
"part" of a whole has been turned into a whole thing
itself (e.g., the "soul" alone, or the "body" alone
are considered separate independent substances in
themselves). And, of course, this leads to the
chronic Platonic or Cartesian problems of a
mind/soul, soul/body, or even a body/body split --
with all of the accompanying chorismos or
"separation" problems latent in those philosophical
position (such as no possibility of any interaction
between the separated "body" and the "mind" or
"soul").
However, if we look closely at the earlier
Aristotelean-Thomistic ball-park definition of a
human person I would submit that -- oddly enough --
it matches the most contemporary body of scientific
facts that are available today. For example, at
fertilization substantial change has taken place,
resulting in an embryonic human zygote possessing 46
chromosomes, and a human nature or potency which
contains all of the information needed to effect or
cause specifically human accidental or embryological
change or development. And this original information
is not lost until the death of the adult human
being. Biological phenomena, such as totipotency,
"positional molecules" and even twinning are really
normal phenomena which are suppose to happen, and
are explained by the human genetic information in
the original single-cell human zygote. Once the
biological facts are correctly understood it is not
difficult to define a human being.
From empirical observations we can then draw our
objectively based philosophical concepts of
personhood, and these philosophical concepts should
surely reflect or match those biological facts as
accurately as possible -- or else we are not
philosophizing about the real world at all.
I have attempted to demonstrate, however briefly,
that to define a "human being" or a "human person"
in terms of only a part of the whole leads to
counterintuitive and incomplete expressions of what
we actually experience about human persons, as well
as a miss-match with the correct empirical facts.
The definition of a "human being" or a "human
person" does not have to be relative -- as long as
the correct science is employed, and our
philosophical definitions actually match that
reality. I leave it up to you to decide which of the
proffered definitions make that match.