Preserving humanity
The idea that humans are to be considered special is more vulnerable
than you would think
The Ottawa Citizen
20 August, 2010
Reproduced with permission
Margaret Somerville*
Wrestling with difficult questions is routine
work for ethicists. But some are much more difficult
than others. Recently, an editor asked me one that
falls in the former category: What did I believe was
presently the world's most dangerous idea?
I replied, "The idea that there is nothing
special about being human and, therefore, humans do
not deserve 'special respect,' as compared with
other animals or even robots." My response might
seem anodyne and a "cop out," but I'd like to try to
convince you otherwise.
Whether humans are "special" -- sometimes
referred to as human exceptionalism or uniqueness --
and, therefore, deserve "special respect" is a
controversial and central question in bioethics, and
how we answer it will have a major impact on many
important ethical issues.
Although I will frame this discussion in a very
limited context of whether humans merit greater
respect than animals and robots, it should be kept
in mind that not seeing human beings and human life
as deserving "special respect" would have very broad
and serious impact far outside this context. It
could affect matters that range from respect for
human rights, to justifications for armed conflict,
how we treat prisoners, how we run our health-care
and aged persons' care systems, the ethical and
legal tones of our societies, and so on.
Although all living beings deserve respect, which
certainly excludes cruelty to animals,
traditionally, humans have been given special
respect, which brings with it special protections,
especially of life. In practice, we have implemented
this special respect through the idea of personhood,
which embodies two concepts: all humans are persons
and no animals are persons. But the concept of
"universal human personhood" -- the idea that all
humans deserve special respect simply because they
are human -- and excluding animals from personhood
are both being challenged.
Some philosophers are arguing that at least
certain animals should be regarded as persons in
order to give them the same rights and protections
as humans. Alternatively, they argue that humans
should be regarded as just another animal, which
results in the same outcome, a loss of special
respect for human beings.
Princeton philosopher, Peter Singer, takes this
latter approach. He believes that distinguishing
humans from other animals and, as a result, treating
animals differently, is a form of wrongful
discrimination he calls "speciesism." In short, he
rejects the claim that humans are special and,
therefore, deserve special respect.
Rather, he believes the respect owed to a living
being should depend only on avoiding suffering to
it, not on whether or not the being is human. That
means that what we do not do to humans in order not
to inflict suffering on them, we should not do to
animals; and what we do to animals to relieve their
suffering and regard as ethical, we should also do
for humans. Consequently, we don't eat humans,
therefore, we shouldn't eat animals. We allow
euthanasia for animals, therefore, we should,
likewise, allow it for humans.
To such philosophers, the attribution of
personhood should not depend, yet again, on being
human, but on having certain characteristics or
capacities to function in certain ways -- for
example, being self aware; having a sense of one's
history and, perhaps, of a future; and possessing a
capacity to relate to others.
Following logically on that, these philosophers
then argue that some seriously mentally disabled
humans and babies, who are among the most
vulnerable, weakest and most in need members of our
societies, are not persons, and, therefore, do not
have the protections personhood brings, for
instance, protection of their right to life. And,
likewise, they propose that at least some animals
should be regarded as non-human persons on the basis
that these animals have some of the characteristics
of personhood that the humans they regard as
non-persons lack. They propose that animals which
are self-conscious, intelligent, and have free will
and emotions comparable to those of humans, should
be treated as non-human persons.
But this idea that simply being human does not
mean one deserves "special respect," rather, the
respect owed to a "being" depends on its having
certain attributes, is not only a serious danger to
vulnerable humans. It could also lead to situations
in which robots would be seen to deserve greater
respect than humans and ethical restrictions on what
we may do to change human life would become
inoperative.
People who believe the kind and degree of respect
owed to an entity depends on its intelligence, would
argue that some super-intelligent robots will
deserve more respect than humans. They define
intelligence narrowly, as logical, cognitive
mentation and, for them, these robots are more
"intelligent" than any humans. This approach has
far-reaching and serious implications, well beyond
the degree of respect that should be shown to an
individual human, as compared with an individual
robot.
If there is nothing special about being human,
there is no essence of our humanness that we must
hold in trust for future generations. That means we
are free to use the new technoscience, as the
transhumanists advocate we should, to alter humans
so that they become "post-human," that is, not human
at all as we know it. In other words, there would be
many less or perhaps no ethical barriers to seeking
the transhumanists' utopian goal, that humans will
become an obsolete model. This would be achieved
through our redesigning ourselves using
technoscience -- or perhaps robots doing so. Instead
of our designing them, they could redesign us!
We used to regard humans as special on the basis
that they had a soul, a divine spark, and animals
did not. But, today, far from everyone accepts the
concept of a soul. Most people, however, at least
act as though we humans have a "human spirit," a
metaphysical, although not necessarily supernatural,
element, as part of the essence of our humanness.
Some philosophers see the ethical and moral sense
humans have as distinguishing humans from animals,
which also have consciousness. They believe humans
are "special" because of this moral sense and,
therefore, deserve "special respect."
I'm an incurable optimist and I believe that
open-minded persons of goodwill, whatever their
beliefs, will conclude that humans deserve special
respect in the sense that there are some things we
should not do to humans, even if we might do them to
animals or robots, although what we currently do to
animals needs very careful ethical consideration.
Implementing and maintaining "special respect"
for humans will require that we recognize humans as
having innate human dignity that must be respected,
and that we regard as unethical interventions that
contravene that dignity, such as designing our
children, making a baby from two same-sex people,
creating human-animal hybrids, cloning humans, using
human embryos as a "manufacturing plant" to produce
therapeutic agents, euthanasia, and, with the new
neuroscience, perhaps most worrying of all,
designing, controlling or intervening on our minds.
It's true that we need to have greater respect
for all life, not just human life. But implementing
that respect should not be by way of denigrating
respect for humans and human life, which equating
humans to animals and to robots does. We are not
just another animal in the forest or another robot
in the laboratory and promoting the idea that we are
is, indeed, a very dangerous one.
Postscript:
After writing this article, I was curious to know
what some of my friends and colleagues would
consider to be the world's most dangerous idea at
present. When I asked them, a large majority
answered, without hesitation, "religion." That
caused me to ponder how their choice correlated with
my choice.
Whatever they believe, the adherents of militant
fundamentalist religions, or any other militant
fundamentalism, certainly do not act according to a
principle that all humans deserve "special respect."
Like the secularists, they also categorize people,
in their case, as believers or infidels and believe
only the former deserve respect. To the extent that
my colleagues see religion as a root cause of this
lack of respect for some people and view that as a
serious harm, my most dangerous idea and theirs are
concordant. But, over millennia, most religions have
been the main institutions carrying and passing on
to future generations the idea that humans are
"special" and deserve "special respect." So, from
that perspective, our most dangerous ideas are in
direct conflict.
This "dual use" potential sounds an important
warning. As with all ideas, even the idea that
humans are "special," or the practice of religion,
can be used not only for good, but also for harm. We
need to be aware, always, that we must seek to
maximize the former and to minimize the latter.