The problem of unregulated
conscientious objection
19 August, 2013
Full Text
In late 2010, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)
was presented with a report from its Social, Health and Family Affairs
Committee expressing deep concern about the problem of "unregulated
conscientious objection" in Europe. The Committee proposed to solve this problem by having states adopt
"comprehensive and clear regulations" to address it.1
The Council ultimately adopted a resolution that almost completely
contradicted the premises of the report,2 but in 2011 the theme was
resurrected by Dr. Leslie Cannold, an Australian ethicist. Dr.
Cannold warned that, "[a]t best, unregulated conscientious objection is an
accident waiting to happen," and, at worst, "a sword wielded by the pious
against the vulnerable with catastrophic results." It was, she wrote, "a
pressing problem from which we can no longer, in good conscience, look
away."3
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights complained about "unregulated
conscientious objection" the following year, demanding that "laws
and policies allowing conscientious objection" be changed.4 Meanwhile, faculty members of Monash and Oxford
Universities
Anne
O'Rourke,
Lachlan De Crespigny, and
Amanda Pyman published a paper attacking "the unregulated use of conscientious objection."5
A paper appearing in April, 2013 in the American Journal of
Public Health advocated the need to challenge "the unregulated
practice of conscientious objection."6
Two months later, the Center for Reproductive Rights
(CRR) and groups forming the
Sexual Rights Initiative did
just that, complaining to
the U.N. Human Rights Council about "unregulated conscientious objection" in
the United States.7
Obstructing access to lawful drugs and procedures
Beginning with the PACE committee report, one of the consistent themes in
these complaints is that "unregulated conscientious objection" is
illegitimate and/or unethical because it hinders access to lawful drugs,
procedures or services.8
Time magazine has now provided a current example of this problem:
By September, Texas will run out of the sole drug it
uses in lethal injections thanks in part to an overseas effort that has
persuaded a European pharmaceutical company to halt its supply to U.S.
states for use in executions.
The Pharmaceutical Hippocratic Oath
The company's decision was the result of a continuing campaign by Amnesty
International and Reprieve, organizations that oppose capital punishment.
Reprieve has been especially successful in convincing pharmaceutical
companies to prevent the use of their products in executions.9 A number
of them have signed Reprieve's Pharmaceutical Hippocratic Oath:
We dedicate our work to developing and distributing pharmaceuticals
to the service of humanity; we will practice our profession with conscience
and dignity; the right to health of the patient will be our first
consideration; we condemn the use of any of our pharmaceuticals in the
execution of human beings.10
Reprieve describes the traditional Hippocratic Oath as the "bedrock of
western medicine" that should apply to drug manufacturers as well as
physicians.11 Maya Foa, a Reprieve
specialist in lethal injection, told Time that Reprieve is not attempting to
stop capital punishment in the United States, but to convince pharmaceutical
companies to abide by the Hippocratic Oath to "do no harm."
Moral/ethical motivation
Some companies that have responded positively to Reprieve's lobbying may have been motivated by legal worries,12and others might have been prompted by fear that bad publicity would reduce profits.13
However, at least
some - including Texas' supplier- have offered moral or ethical reasons for their
refusal to supply drugs for lethal injections:
Lundbeck: ". . .Use of our products to end
lives contradicts everything we're in business to do – provide therapies
that help improve people's lives . . ."
Kayem: ". . .we voluntarily declare that we as
Indian Pharma Dealer who cherish the Ethos of Hinduism (A believer even in
non-livings as the creation of God) refrain ourselves in selling this drug
where the purpose is purely for Lethal Injection and its misuse."
Ganpati Exem: ". . . We are deeply
opposed to the use of medicines in killing prisoners and wish to have no
part in facilitating capital punishment in the USA or elsewhere. . ."14
Corporate freedom of conscience
These statements are clearly analogous to the ethical positions taken by
physicians and other health care workers - especially pharmacists - who, for
reasons of conscience, refuse to participate in procedures like abortion,
assisted suicide and euthansia. In fact, the Euthanasia Prevention
Coalition fully supports the Pharmaceutical Hippocratic Oath and has asked
Maya Foya to extend the Stop the Lethal Injection Project (SLIP) to prevent the
use of pentobarbital in euthanasia and assisted suicide.15
Here we encounter an obstacle erected by those complaining about unregulated conscientious objection.
They
claim that institutions or corporations
are not entitled to exercise freedom
of conscience, since (they say) only individuals have consciences, so only
individuals can assert a right to freedom of conscience.16
The Irish government has recently adopted this view with respect to
Catholic hospitals,17 while the New
York Times editorial board has relied on the same reasoning to denounce
civil liberties lawsuits brought by businesses: "Profit-making corporations
are not human beings capable of engaging in religious exercise."18
Certainly, the New York Times editorial board could argue that
corporations or institutions that sign the Pharmaceutical Hippocratic Oath
are not "really" exercising conscientious objection or not "really" taking a
moral or ethical stand, even though that is how it appears. It could
describe Lundbeck's decision purely in terms of amoral corporate autonomy,
or as a naked exercise of corporate self-interest. It could, if it
wished, even argue that it is legitimate to refuse to supply legal products
for lawful purposes if the decision is based on worries about profitability,
but not if based on moral conviction.19
Of course, all of this would require that the New York Times
continue to do what it did in its editorial: adopt and act upon corporate
moral or ethical convictions, which, according to its editorial, a
corporation cannot possibly have.
Corporate moral/ethical responsibility
In any case, there is a point beyond which deconstruction becomes
fabrication. It is not reasonable to assert that those who sign the
Pharmaceutical Hippocratic Oath intend to express only a commitment to
corporate profits and success, and do not mean to express moral or
ethical convictions about executions by lethal injection. Moreover, the
tone and content of the Time magazine article suggests that the
corporate signatories to Oath did nothing unusual or inappropriate in
formulating and acting upon conscientious convictions about execution by
lethal injection.
On the contrary: the reader is left with the impression that corporate
recognition of moral obligations is entirely natural and expected. Those cited or quoted
by Time believe that pharmaceutical companies are ethically obliged to
prevent their products from being used for executions, and would be culpably
negligent if they did not. For example, Time quotes an open
letter to the chief executive officer of Lundbeck from Dr. David Nicholl and
60 physicians and academics stating that they were "appalled at the inaction
of Lundbeck to prevent the supply of their drug, Nembutal [pentobarbital],
for use in executions in the USA." (Emphasis added.)
Facilitation and Referral
Contrast this with Dr. Cannold's approach: that objectors may "step away from participating in an activity
to which they object, but cannot step in the way" to prevent people
from accessing lawful services. On this view, even if corporations
were entitled to exercise freedom of conscience (and the New York Times,
Dr. Cannold and others say they are not), they would not be entitled to
actively prevent access to pentobarbital. On the contrary: Dr. Cannold
and her confreres demand that objectors facilitate access to morally
contested procedures by referral or some other means, so that no one is deprived of
access to a lawful service. This is touted as a "balance" of competing
rights, or as a compromise.20 Under this
kind of regulatory scheme, Lundbeck
would be required to help the state of Texas find alternative supplies of
pentobarbital or other drugs that could be used for lethal injection.
This would be clearly unacceptable to Reprieve and the
signatories to the Pharmaceutical Hippocratic Oath. After all, none of
the companies were directly involved in providing lethal objections to begin
with. Pressure brought to bear on them was effective because of a general
conviction that even blind distribution of pentobarbital through middlemen
was sufficient to make them morally complicit in executions by lethal
injection, since it was possible to arrange distribution to prevent
executioners from obtaining the drug. It is ludicrous to suggest that
Reprieve or the signatories would agree that deliberately facilitating
executions by referring executioners to other sources of pentobarbital
involves no significant degree of moral complicity.
The ethical norms approved by the American Medical Association and the
World Medical Association are relevant here. Both associations
consider it unethical for physicians to participate in capital punishment,
and both define participation to include indirect facilitation in any way.21
In 2012 the WMA reaffirmed this position and expressly stated that
physicians must not "facilitate the importation or prescription of drugs for
execution."22
Corporate moral/ethical evangelism
Lundbeck sold
the rights to pentobarbital to an American firm in 2011, but the sale was
conditional upon an agreement that the new company would adhere to the same
restrictions on the distribution of the drug as Lundbeck. The
agreement effectively imposed Lundbeck's corporate moral view of execution
by lethal injection on the American company, apparently in perpetuity, but it does not appear
that the condition has been challenged or questioned. Time reported the agreement without comment and without
seeking comment from third parties, which suggests that both the reporter
and Time''s editors considered the restriction on distribution to be
within the parameters of ordinary and acceptable business arrangements.
Compare this with the controversy that often erupts when Catholic
hospitals attempt to make conformity to Catholic teaching a requirement in
hospital mergers. Such restrictions are loudly
protested and contested by groups like
MergerWatch and the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).23
Three weeks before the Time story appeared, the Seattle Times
praised the Governor of Washington State for directing a review of rules
governing hospital mergers and partnerships. The Governor was
responding to lobbying by the ACLU, among others, who complained that
Catholic institutions are likely to insist upon Lundbeck-type restrictions
against elective abortion and assisted suicide.24
Much of this was left out of the
Time feature because the magazine
did not make the connection between Lundbeck's refusal to supply
pentobarbital to executioners and ongoing controversy about freedom of
conscience in health care. The story of Lundbeck and the
Pharmaceutical
Hippocratic Oath is not just a story about opposition to capital
punishment, but about "the problem of unregulated conscientious objection,"
presented in a new and potentially enlightening context.
Notes
1. PACE Social, Health and Family Affairs
Committee,
Report Women's access to lawful medical care: the problem of unregulated
use of conscientious objection. Doc. 12347, 20 July 2010.
(Accessed 2013-08-18) (Hereinafter "The Report")
2. PACE Resolution 1763 (2010) The right to
conscientious objection in lawful medical care. 7 October, 2010
3. Cannold, Leslie, "The questionable ethics of unregulated conscientious refusal."
ABC Religion and Ethics,
25 Mar 2011. (Accessed 2013-08-11)
4. Human Rights Council, Twentieth session, Agenda items 2 and 3:
Annual Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights- Technical guidance on the application of a human rightsbased approach
to the implementation of policies and programmes to reduce preventable
maternal morbidity and mortality (2 July, 20012) para. 61, 30 (Accessed 2013-08-11)
5. O'Rourke A. De Crespigny L. and Pyman A. "Abortion and
Conscientious Objection: The New Battleground" (July 10, 2012). Monash Law
Review (2012) Vol 38(3): 87-119. (Accessed 2013-08-18)
6. Finer L., Fine JB.,
Abortion Law Around the World: Progress and Pushback. American
Journal of Public Health; Apr 2013, Vol. 103 Issue
4, p. 585. (Accessed 2013-08-18)
7. Human Rights Council, 23nd Session - June 3, 2013.
Agenda Item 3: Presentation of Reports by the Special Rapporteur on Violence
against Women.
Oral
Statement: Center for Reproductive Rights. (Accessed 20-13-08-11)
8. Evident in the title of The Report,
which a Center for Reproductive Rights regional manager and senior legal
advisor helped to draft. Dr. Cannold refers specifically to "legal
abortion" and asserted that health care workers must not block access to
"lawful services" to which people are entitled. O'Rourke, De Crespigny, and
Pyman argue "that the unregulated use of conscientious objection impedes
women's rights to access safe lawful medical
procedures." (Emphasis added). The Center for Reproductive Rights
protests that unregulated conscientious objection allows health care workers
to "deny women access to lawful reproductive health
services based on moral or religious objections." (Emphasis added)(Center for
Reproductive Rights,
Abortion Opponents Undercut Council of Europe Resolution on
Conscientious Objection. 7 October, 2010 (Accessed 2013-08-18)
9. Sandburn, Josh, "The Hidden Hand Squeezing Texas' Supply of Execution
Drugs: After lobbying by human-rights groups, European drug
companies are increasingly unwilling to supply U.S. states with lethal
medicine." Time, 7 August, 2013. (Accessed
2013-08-10)
10.
Sign the Pharmaceutical Hippocratic Oath. Reprieve, 26
March, 2012.
(Accessed 2013-08-19)
11.
Sign the Pharmaceutical Hippocratic Oath. Reprieve, 26
March, 2012.
(Accessed 2013-08-19)
12. "We cannot take the risk that we will be held liable
by the Italian authorities if the product is diverted for use in capital
punishment. Exposing our employees or facilities to liability is not a risk
we are prepared to take."
Hospira Statement Regarding Pentothal (sodium thiopental) Market Exit,
21 January, 2011.
(Accessed 2013-08-18)
13. Fear of bad publicity is cited explicitly by
anti-execution campaigner Dr. David Nicholl, who is quoted in the Time
article.
14. Reprieve,
Ethical Statements from Pharmaceutical Firms
(Accessed 2013-08-18)
15. Schadenberg, Alex,
Drug Company Stops Distributing Euthanasia Drug for Texas Executions.
Euthanasia Prevention Coaltion, 8 August, 2013. (Accessed 2013-08-19)
16.
"According to international human rights law, the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is an individual right
and, therefore, institutions such as hospitals cannot claim this right." The Report, Section 4.2, paragraph 25. (Despite the claim
that this assertion has a basis in law, no authority is cited to support
it.) Dr. Cannold insists that "only individuals have consciences, and
so conscience rights." The Center for Reproductive Rights opposes
freedom of conscience for institutions and corporations because
"[i]nstitutions and corporations don't have feelings and they don't have
consciences either." (Center for Reproductive Rights,
Questions and Answers on "Right to Conscience" Laws.
(Accessed 2013-08-18). Acknowledging that freedom of conscience is a
human right, O'Rourke, De Crespigny, and Pyman assert that"only human
beings, not hospitals or related entities, have human rights."
17.
An unnamed Department of Health official stated that
the new Irish abortion law allows for conscientious objection by
individuals, but not by hospitals. O'Regan, Eilish, "Hospitals
have no right to opt out of abortion law, priest told." Irish
Independent, 8 Augu, 8 August, 2013
(Accessed 2013-08-18)
18. Editorial: "Contraception and Corporations."
New York Times, 2 August, 2013. (Accessed 2013-08-05)
19. Such assertions have occasionally been made, but have not been
consistently and continuously articulated. See Project Letter to the
Editor, Pharmacy Practice, 13 July, 2000; Alarcon, Cristina,
Economics Outweighs Ethical Principles in the Pharmacy Profession,
18 October, 2004.
20.
The Report, Part A. ( Draft
Resolution) paragraphs 4.1.2.2 - 4.1.2.3. Dr. Cannold describes a
mandatory referral provision in an Australian abortion law as an attempt to
balance the rights of women and objecting medical practitioners, though she
believes it does not go far enough in imposing obligations on objectors.
O'Rourke, De Crespignyand Pyman also see the provision as a "balancing act,"
but find it satisfactory.
21.
WMA
Resolution on Physician Participation in Capital Punishment.
Adopted by the 34th World Medical Assembly, Lisbon, Portugal,
September/October 1981 and amended by the 52nd WMA General
Assembly, Edinburgh, Scotland, October 2000 and the 59th WMA
General Assembly, Seoul, Korea, October 2008.
(Accessed
2013-08-19)
American Medical Association Policy E-2.06:Capital
Punishment
(Accessed 2013-06-24)
22.
WMA
Resolution to Reaffirm the WMA's Prohibition of Physician Participation in
Capital Punishment. Adopted by the 63rd
General Assembly of the World Medical Association, Bangkok, Thailand,
October 2012. (Accessed 2013-08-19)
23.
Hospital
Mergers: The Threat to Reproductive Health Services. American Civil
Liberties Union, 31 December, 1995.
(Accessed 2013-08-18)
24. Editorial: "A
sensible response to hospital merger concerns." Seattle Times,,
21 July, 2013.
(Accessed 2013-08-18)