Chief Justice favours assisted suicide, willing to order assistance
Re: Rodriguez and Attorney General of British Columbia et al
Supreme Court of Canada, 30 September, 1993: Court File 23476
107 D.L.R. (4th) 342, 85 C.C.C. (3d) 15, 20 W.C.B. (2d) 589
Introduction:
After her attempts to have the law against assisted suicide set aside by
lower courts failed, Sue Rodriguez appealed to the Supreme Court of
Canada. While the Supreme Court narrowly dismissed her appeal (5-4),
Chief Justice Antonio Lamer (dissenting) expressed the opinion that
assisted suicide should be available to all, not just to those
terminally ill and near death, and that everyone should be entitled to
assistance in committing suicide.
Inferences about the legal and
political environment in Canada may be drawn from the fact that the
Rodriguez' appeals were dismissed at each level by such narrow margins,
and that the Chief Justices of British Columbia and of Canada supported
her position. Those who object to euthanasia or assisted suicide have
cause for concern that the Chief Justice of Canada implied that some
unspecified actor had a duty to assist Rodriguez to commit suicide.
Rodriguez was later killed in the presence of Canadian Member of
Parliament Svend Robinson with an injection said to have been provided
by an unidentified physician. [Administrator]
SUMMARY:
The appellant is terminally ill, suffering from a
progressive disease of the motor neurons. There is
no cure for the disease and the average duration of
life is about three years. Evidence indicated that
the appellant would become bedridden and unable to
speak or to care for herself. The disease does not
usually affect the mind of the patient. The
appellant sought a declaration to the effect that
she was entitled to have assistance in committing
suicide when her condition becomes no longer
bearable. By that time, she would be unable to
commit suicide without the assistance of another
person. Section 241(b) of the Criminal Code makes it
an offence for anyone to aid or abet a person to
commit suicide. . .
Lamer, C.J.C. (dissenting)
. . .The constitutional exemption I propose would
be available only on the authority of a superior
court order, granted on terms similar to those
outlined by McEachern, C.J.B.C. . . . However, I
would make an important change to the order he would
have granted in this appeal.
I have held that S. 241(b) violates the equality
rights of all persons who desire to commit suicide
but are or will become physically unable to do so
unassisted. Restricting the remedy to those who are
terminally ill, and suffering from incurable
diseases or conditions, as McEachern, C.J.B.C. would
have, does not follow from the principles underlying
my holding, and might well itself give rise to a
violation of the equality rights of those who do not
fit that description but wish to commit suicide and
need assistance. Therefore, I would eliminate that
part of McEachern C.J.B.C.'s conditions for a court
order granting the constitutional exemption [i.e.,
that the patient be "terminally ill and near death,
and that there is no hope of recovering" - Ed.].
There is another aspect of McEachern C.J.B.C.'s
order that has caused me concern. One of McEachern
C.J.B.C.'s conditions is that the act of terminating
the appellant's life be hers and not anyone else's.
While I believe this to be appropriate in her
current circumstances as a mechanism can be put in
place allowing her to cause her own death with her
limited physical capabilities, why should she be
prevented the option of choosing suicide should her
physical condition degenerate to the point where she
is no longer even physically able to press a button
or blow into a tube? Surely, it is in such
circumstances that assistance is required most.
Given that Ms. Rodriguez has not requested such an
order, however, I need not decide the issue at this
time. Therefore, I prefer to leave it to be resolved
at a later date. . .